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BEYOND THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATES: 
THE UNPRECEDENTED EXPANSION OF 
SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
UNDER CYBERBULLYING LAWS 
Emily F. Suskit 
ABSTRACT 
For several years, states have grappled with the problem of 
cyberbullying and its sometimes devastating effects. Because 
cyberbullying often occurs between students, most st ates have 
understandably looked t o schools to help address the problem. To 
t hat end, schools in forty-six states have t he authority to intervene 
when students engage in cyberbullying. This solut ion seems all to the 
good unless a close examination of the cyberbullying laws and their 
implications is made. T his Art icle explores some of t he problematic 
implications of the cyberbullying laws. More specifically, it focuses on 
how the cyberbullying laws allow schools unprecedented surveillance 
authority over students. This aut hority stands in notably stark 
contrast to the constraints on government aut hority in other context s, 
including police authority to search cell phones. In June 2014, the 
Supreme Court recogni~ed in Riley v. California t hat police searches 
of cell phones require a warrant because of t he particular intrusions 
into privacy attendant to t hose searches. W hile some surveillance 
authority over students may be warranted, the majority of the 
cyberbullying laws implicit ly give schools unlimited, or nearly 
unlimited, and unfettered surveillance authority over students ' online 
and electronic activity whenever, wherever, and however it occurs: at 
home, in bedrooms, at t he mall, on personal cell phones, on tablets, or 
on laptops. 
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enacted one of the first such laws in 2008/ and fort._v-six states and 
the District of Columbia nmv have b.1vs prohibiting e,yberbullying. '1 
The laws are a re~:Jponse to both the increased attention to the 
problem of cyberbullying over the last several years and calls-to-
action to address it. 1 These calls have been made for good reason: 
cyberbullying is a. prevalent, sornetinws tragic, problem.'' According to 
HEV. STAT.§§ :3:39.:351, :3:19.:156 (2011); 24 PA. Cm>s. STAT. A:'-11\. § 1:1-
1303.1-A C\Vest Supp. 2014); ru. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-21-3:.! to 16-21-34 
(Supp. 2013); S.C. CODE Al\·1\'. §§ 59-6:!-120 to 59-63-150 (Supp. 2013): 
S.D. Conwrr;n LAWS §§ 1:3-:32-14 t.o 13-:32-14 (Supp. 2013); Tr;J\N. 
CoDE A:'-11\. §§ 49-6-4502 to 49-6-4503 (201:3): TEX. EDUC. CoDE Al\·N. 
§ 37.0832 (\Vest 2014); UTAH CoDE A:'-11\. § 5:3A-lla (Lexisl\"exis Supp. 
2013): VT. STAT. A'-11\·. tit. 16, §§ 11, 570 (Supp. 2013): VA. CoDE 
AN'<. §§ 22.1-276.01, 22.1-29'1.4 (Supp. 20'14); \VASH. Ih:v. Com; 
§ 28A.300.285 (2012); \V. VA. Com; A'-11\. § 18-2C (LexisNexis 2012); 
WYO. STAT. A="'l\·. §§ 21-4-:312 to 21-4-:312 (2011). The District of 
Columbia also has a la>v prohibiting bullying, but it is not contained in 
its education code. Instead it is part of its government affairs statutes. 
Nonetheless, (,he statu(,e requires schools t.o a.dopt the del'iniUon of' 
bullying, including cyberbullying. D.C. CoDE §§ 2-15:35.01 to 2-L'i35.09. 
As another example, Idaho's bullying statute is part of its penal code, 
though it only refers to "student'' actions. lDAllO CODE AN'-1. § 18-917A 
(2006). 
2. .Jeremy Thomas &. Kat.y l\lurphy, Cyberlmllying: Parents, S~chool 
Officials Both Search for Ans?Ders, SAN .JosE :rviERCURY NEWS, ]\lay 2, 
2013, http:/ / w\vw.rnercurynews.eomj ci_23158922/ cyberbullying-parents 
-school-ol'f'icials-bot,h-search-a.nswers. 
;). Alaska, Kentucky, and \Visconsin do not include bullying by electronic 
means or any other definition of cyberbullying in their bullying· laws. 
ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. Al\'N. § 525.070 
(West. 2006): '\V1s. STA'I'. AN'<. § 1'l8.4G (West. Supp. 2013). :.vrontana 
does not. have a bullying law of' any sort .. 
4. Scholars, journalists. and nonprofit. groups, among others, have all called 
for action to address the problem. E.g., 1\"aorni H. Goodno, How Public 
Schools Can Consiilnlionally Hall Cyberbu.llying: A Model Cyberbnllying 
Policy Thal Considers Firsl Amendmenl; Due P rocess, and Fonrlh 
Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FoREST L. R EV. 641 (2011) 
(advocating for a policy likely to survive a constitutional challenge); 
Kelly A. Albin, 13ullies in a Wired ~1/odd: The lm.po.ct of Cylwrspo.ce 
Vic/.imizalion on Adolescent. Menl.al Heallh and lhe Need f or 
Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 .J.L. &. HEAL'T'H 155 (2012) 
(describing harms caused by cyberbullying and proposes legislat.ion to 
address it); Ou-r Mission, STO~lP Ot·T 13\.'LLYl'-IG, http: / / ww>v. 
stompoutbullying.org/inclex.php/ about, j mission/ (la.'3t. visit.ed .June 24, 
2014); (explaining mission t.o prevent bullying and cyberbullying, which 
sometimes leads victims to commit suicide) PACER CE:'<'T'ER'S 'IATTO:'<AL 
13\JLLYll\'C PREVEl\'Tl0'-1 CEJ\'TER, http: / / w>vw.pacer.org/ bullying/ 
nbprn/ (last visited .June 24, 2014) (suggPBt.ing \Vays in which students, 
parents, and educators can take st.eps t.o raise bullying awareness). 
0. Sec .rJcncrally Li:>:cttc Alvarez, Girl's Suicide Point8 to Ri8c in A pps 
(J.~ed by Oyber/m.llie8, I\. Y. Tnms, Sept. 14, 2013 (deBcribing hmv a 
4
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one study of t.wclvc-t.o-scvcntecn-year-olds, 72 percent of Internet. 
users reported at least one instance of bullying in the inuuediate prior 
yea.r. t' Of those in the study, ;:Jl percent reported experiencing online 
bullying by other st.udent.s in their school.' Given that t.his study was 
conducted iu 2008, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
cyberbullying problem has not decrea~:Jed vvith the increasing ubiquity 
of technology in t.he last few years, including new apps for texting and 
otherwise engaging through social media, some of which even provide 
for anonymous posting. 8 
Cybcrbullying is not. only a widespread problem but also one thai. 
can also have devastating effects. H.ebecca Ann Sedwick serves as just 
one of many tragic examples of the effects of cyberbullyingY Rebecca 
was a twelve-year-old Florida girl who conuni!Jed suicide in 
September 2013 by jumping off a platform at au abandoned cement 
plant after enduring more than a. year of bullying by text message and 
over the Int.crnet.10 
D.Y prohibiting cyberbullyiug among students, the cyberbullyiug 
la.vvs are undoubtedly aimed at preventing more cases like Rebecca's 
and curbing t.he incidences of cyberbullying more generally. In intent., 
then, the laws heed the calls-to-action that have served as the 
catalyst for their ena.ctn1ent. Yet the manner in vvhich the laws 
address the problem of cyberbullying creates it.s own set. of problems. 
ln a majority of states, the:r arguabl.Y provide schools 1vith unlimited 
or nearly unli1nited authority to conduct electronic surveillance of 
students' online and electronic activit~r \:vheuever and \:vherever that 
activity occurs. 
How do the cybcrbullying laws provide schools with surveillance 
authorit:y? l3y allowing schools the authority to discipline students for 
cyberbullying, they implicitly provide schools with the authority to 
ferret out. the problemY To determine vvhcthcr and when students arc 
engaged in c:yberbullyiug, the schools have a fe\:v options, but among 
twelve-year-old Florida girl committed suicide after being bullied on 
va.rious t.exting and photo-sharing apps). 
6. ,Jaarm .Juvoncn & Elishcva F. Gross, Extending the School Grounds ? 
Bullying ExpeT"iences ·in CybeTspnce, 78 .J. Scu. HEALTH 496, 502 
(2009). The definitions of bullying in most bullying laws-twenty-
eight-prohibit. bullying that occurs as one-time acts. See infra. note 26 
and accompanying text .. 
7. ld. at 501 02. 
8. :\Helme! H. King, Could /.he App Yik Yak Be a Cyberbullying Tool? 
(Feb. 22, 2014, 12:33 AlVJ), http://ros>vcll.l1nlivc.com/ncw;;/cduwtion/ 
608482-could-app-yik-y<lk-bc-cybcrbullying-tool. 
9. Alvarez, suprr1. note 5, at Al. 
10. Id. 
ll. Sec infra Part T.A. 
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the most. effective and efficient means is developing a system for 
comprehensivel.Y monitoring students· online and electnmic activit.)r .12 
Because cyberbullying lavvs do not prohibit this surveillance, they 
arguably allow schools to reach into students' lives while they arc al. 
home, ·work, the mall or other non-school places and gather electronic 
data on the students in the name of learning about cyberbullying 
activity. The laws expand the proverbial schoolhouse gates to such a 
degree that, in many cases, schools· authority to conduct surveillance 
of students is nearly 1vithout bounds.1:3 
Some schools arc beginning t.o grab this implicit. power under the 
cyberbullying la1vs t.o conduct just. this level of surveillance. While the 
exercise of this implicit authority is ne\v, at least a few schools and 
school districts have now hired (at no small expense) companies to 
comprehensively monitor the online and electronic: activity of all their 
students at all locations and tinws. For example, in July 2014, 
Jackson County School District in Korth Carolina announced that il. 
is paying a private company, Social Sentinel, $9,500 for one :year t o 
1nonitor the social media postings of all students in one of its high 
schools in order to uncover cyberbullying and other thrcatsY The 
school district's position is that when it comes to those kinds of 
threats, students have ''"no expectation of privacy. That is the 
policy."'1-' This surveillance--in Jackson County, 1\ort.h Carolina, and 
other schools that have started using similar services-occurs no 
1natter vvhether the students are engaged in or are suspected of being 
engaged in cyberbullying activity or even whether the students are 
involved in any activity that has any relationship at all to the school 
or its pedagogical interest.s.w Potential abuses abound and actual 
12. ld. Sehoul administrators have lamented the difficulty >vith catching 
online bullying. In the case or another student. suicide attempt in 
California after other students taunted the student online and called her 
"ugly" and "a whore," the school principal investigated. However, she is 
quoted as saying, "'It was pretty awful for a while, and we couldn't 
substantiat e any or it .. It's like c:lwsing a tail or a piece of yarn . 
Thomas & l'viurphy, snpra note 2. 
l:.t In Tinker v. Des .Moines Indcp. Sch. Dist., the Supreme Court found 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the 
schoolhouse gate." 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). vVhere those schoolhouse 
gates begin and end is nmv the question under cyberbullying laws. Part 
IT will discuss the unprecedented breadth of surveillance authority 
currently provided to schools under these statutes. 
14. Quinlin Ellison, School Officials /.o Monilor Slndenls' Social Media Us e, 
SYLVlA HbitALD, July 24, 2014, at. 1A. 
15. !d. (quoting .Jackson Schools' Technology Director Du.vid P roffitt). 
16. Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schoo/8 Wr1tch Stv.dent8 on the Internet, .\./. Y . 
Tn .. IES, Oct. 29, 201:::1, at Al; Kelly \\Fallace, Al Some Schools. "Big 
JJrother'' Ts Watching (1\Tu.r. 28, 2014, 9:31 Pl\T), http: / / w;vv.;.cnn.com/ 
2013/ 11 /08 / living / schools-of.-thought-social-mcd ia-mon itoring-students/ . 
6
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abuses have occurred. In 2010, school officials in Pennsylvania viewed 
students in their bedrooms because of surveillance made possible by 
the web cameras on school-issued laptops.17 Yet because schools are 
under pressure t.o avoid blame for tragedies like student. suicide, t.hcrc 
is good reason to think that more will use the implicit surveillance 
authority under cyberbullying.1' 
It is wit.h t.his surveillance aut.horit.y t.hat. t.his Article is concerned. 
This Article argues that the cyberbull:ying laws, though well meaning, 
a.llmv for an unprecedented expansion of school authority that 
implicates privacy harms, which arc made more acute because t.hc 
authority is held over the students by the schools. This grant of 
surveillance power to schools and its i1nplications have largely gone 
overlooked by bot.h scholars writing on the t.opic of bullying laws and 
privac:r and surveillance studies scholars. 1'1 Drawing on the more 
general work of these scholars and locating cyberbullying laws in that 
literature, t.his Article examines t.his grant of aut.horit.y t.o schools and 
its harms and then calls for changes in the l<YWS both to limit school 
surveillance authority and the privacy harms created by that 
aut.horit.y. I1. should be noted t.hat. t.hc surveillance wit.h which t.his 
Article is concerned is distinct from the disciplinar,y authority of the 
schools under the cyberbullying laws. The surveillance happens before 
any act. occurs for which some discipline might. be warranted. 
\Vhether that discipline is appropriate is a topic beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
17. Suzan Cl<1rke, Pa. School Faces FRJ Probe, J,aws1dt, for Using 
1Vebca.rns an Laptops to 1Vatch Students at Harne (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http:/ jabcne>vs.go.cornjGJ\lA/Parenting/pennsylvania-schuol-fbi-probe-
've bcarn-st udents-spying/ story ?id = 9905488. 
18. Indeed, even the companies that sell surveillance products and services 
to schools expect significant market p;rowth. \Vallace, supra note 16. 
19. The bullying scholarship tends to cover the constitutional implications 
or bullying laws and whether they viol<1te the First.. and Fourth 
Amendments. To this A ut..hor's knowledge, none or the scholarship 
addresses the surveillance authority implicit under cyberbullying laws or 
its privacy implications. £.g., Goodno, s·upra note 4. (suggesting a 
regulatory frarne,vork for eyberbullying but not addressing the implicit 
authority currently available to states). There is no doctrine yet. on 
what, if any, legal limits exist on school aut.horit.y to conduct 
surveillance or its implications. Hmvever, privacy scholars have written 
about topics such as privacy rights and the harms implicated by broad-
ba:3ed government. (as well as private) surveillance. E.g., Neil l\L 
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HAnv. L. RbV. 1934 (2013); 
Dn.nielle K. Citron & Du.vid Grn.y, A ddressinq the Harm of Total 
Sur"lw:illnnce: A ileply to Yroft:8sor Neil Nidwrds, 126 HARV. L. B..EV. F. 
262 (201:3); Daniel ,J. Solove, A To.:wnmny of Pr··ivncy, Fi4 U. PA. L. 
Rts. 477 (2006). Those privacy harms apply in t.he school surveillance 
context as >vell and provide theoretical and policy bases for the 
argument that school surveillance authority should have legal limits. 
7
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Part I of t.his Article catalogs the cybcrlmllying laws, explaining 
the three levels into which the grants of surveillance authority to 
schools fall: (1) the grant of authority requiring a substantial nexus to 
the school or school-related activities; (2) the grant of authority wit.h 
a more limited nexus to the school or school-related activities: and (3) 
the grant of authority with no nexus to ~chool or school-related 
activities. This Part also describes how broad the potential scope of 
the surveillance authority given to schools in the majorit:y of states 
really i~. To show that the broad surveillance authority represents an 
unprecedented expansion of school authority, Part. II begins by 
discussing extant limits on the school authorit.Y under First and 
Fourth Amendment ~tudent-~peech and ~earch doctrine as 1vell a~ 
doctrine on government surveillance more generally. Alt.hough there 
are no dear doctrinal limits on general, broad-based surveillance of 
student~. this First and Fourth Anwndnwnt doctrine offers guidance 
on the limits of school authority more generally. So too docs doctrine 
on government surveillance outside the school context: thus it also 
offers ~ome guidepost~ for the li1nits on state and therefore school 
surveillance authority. This Part also explains how t.hc surveillance 
authority under the majority of c:yberbullyiug statutes exceeds or 
nearly exceeds all of these limits. \Vhile this expan~ion of ~chool 
authority beyond its current limits might. be deemed acceptable in the 
name of combatting c,yberbullyiug, Part 111 explains wh:y it is not: 
surveillance of students implicates privacy harms. Thi~ Part both 
outlines the privac:y harms attendant to the enormous surveillance 
authority schools nmv have under t.he cyberbullying law~ and 
contends t.hat these harms arc made more severe because t.he 
surveillance authority lies with the schools. Part l V then calls for 
changes in the cyberbullying lav,·~ both to limit ~chools' ~urveillance 
authority and the attendant privacy harms and t.o allow students to 
seek redress 1vheu those limits on school surveillance authority have 
been tran~gres~ed. Thi~ Part argues in favor of an analytical 
framework that. uses t.hc nexus theory of school aut.horit.y, developed 
under the First Amendment line of student-speech cases, for defining 
~chool authority to conduct electronic ~urveillance of ~tudent~. 
I. THE CYBERB1;LL YI:\TG LAWS A:\TD THEIR THREE LEVELS 
OF SCHOOL SCRVE!LLA:\TCE AUTHOR!TY 
C uder cyberbullyiug laws in the forty-six states and the District 
of Columbia, the grant of ~urveillance authorit.y to schools fall~ into 
one of three categorical levels: ( 1) a grant. of aut.horit.y wit.h no nexus 
to school or school-related aetivity:~0 (2) a grant of authorit]' with a 
20. Sec infra. note 64 and accompanying text. 
8
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limited nexus to school or school-related activity;:n and (3) a grant. 
requiring a relatively substantial nexus to school or school-related 
activityY The vast majority of cyberbullying laws provide schools 
with surveillance authority that falls into one of the first two 
categories. ln those states, the schools have nearly unlimited or 
unlimited surveillance authorit~r over students' online and electronic 
activity. Because it is perhaps easiest to understand the broadest 
grant of surveillance authority under cyberbull:ying la1vs b,y first 
understanding the 1nost limited grant of authority under these laws , 
Part B of this section will first describe the most limited grant of 
school surveillance authorit.Y and work its >va:y up through the other 
tvvo categorical levels of school surveillance authority in a.':Jcending 
order. First, however, a more thorough description of the 
c:yberbullying lmvs is 1varranted. 
A. The Cylu:T"Im.llrting La·ws · Impl'ir:it Autluwiwf'ion 
of S'llrm~manr:e Auth(wity 
While they var:y in the details, bullying la1vs in general have some 
of the same basic elenwnts, regardless of whether they have a 
cybcrbullying component. Bullying lavvs arc, for the most part, 
creatures of states' student disciplinary codes or regulatory schemes 2 ·1 
They either prohibit a student in a school from acting, even once, in a 
way that puts another student in reasonable fear of harm, or they 
prohibit a student in a school from engaging in potentially less severe 
but repeated behavior that cffcct.i vcly rises to the level of 
hara.ssrnent. 21 Ten states prohibit only repeated acts of bullying2 ·' 
Thirty-five states prohibit both one-time and repeated acts of 
bullying.11; Nevada, for example, prohibits both a "willful ad" or a 
21. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.. 
22. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
23. See generally 8upra note 22 a.nd accompanying text.. 
24. Sec generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.. 
25. ALA. ConE § 16-28B (2012); CO:-ll';. GEN. STAT. AN:-l. § 10-222d(l) 
(Supp 2014); FLA. STAT. AN:-l. § 1006.147(3)(a) (Supp. 2014); 1:-lD. 
CODE A:'fl\. § 20-3:{-8-0.2(a) (\\Fest. Supp. 2014); :\IASS. Cb:'-1. LAWS ch. 
71, § 370(a.) (\Vest. Supp. 2014): LA. REV. STAT. A:-.~1\. § 17:416.13(c) 
(Supp. 2014); N.:\T. ConE R. § 6.12.7.7(A) (Lcxisl\cxis 2014); Omo 
HEV. CODE A:-ll\'. § ;)31:3.666(A) (LexisNexis 201:3); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § B-32-15 (Supp. 20B); Vr. S'i'A'i'. AN:'-1. tiL 16, § 11 (Supp. 
2013). 
26. ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.2G0(:3) (2012); ARK. ConE AN:-l. § 6-1 8-
;)l4(b)(2) (2009); CAL. Euuc. ConE§ 48900(r)(1) (\Vest Supp. 2014); 
COLO. REV. S'i'A'i'. § 22-:{2-109.1(b) (2012); DEL. CODE Al\N. tiL 14, 
§ 4112D(a) (Supp. 2012); CA. CODE. Al\N. § 20-2-751.4(a) (West 2012); 
HAW. ConE R. § 8-19-2 (LcxisNcxis 2014): IDAHO ConE AJ\·N. § 18-
917A(2) (2006); lND. CODE § 20-:3:3-8-02(a) 2007; KA:-l. STAT. Al\·N. 
9
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"course of conduc1." if t.hc act or course of conduct. "places t.he person 
in reasonable fear of harm or serious emotional distress; or . . creates 
a.n environment \Vhich is hostile to a pupil by interfering vvith the 
education of t.he pupil. "27 
Dull,ying laws proscribing a one-time act, behavior, or conduct. 
stipulate that the act, behavior, or conduct be directed toward 
another student and put that. student in reasonable fear of physical or 
emotional harm or result in similarly harmful effects.2' Tennessee, for 
example, provides one definition of bullying as "any act that 
substantially interferes with a student's educational benefits, 
opportunities or performance: and . . has the effect. of [k]nowingly 
placing a student or students in reasonable fear of physical harm. "2\1 
For statutes dTectivcly proscribing harassment., behavior is 
subject. to discipline if it. substa.nt.iall:y interferes 1vit.h the target. 
student's educational performance or ability to benefit from the 
services or activities of school,:UJ or substantially disrupts the orderly 
operations of the sehool.:u ln lmva, ''bull:ying" and "harassment." have 
the same definition in the school contextY They are defined as 
§ 72-8256(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2013); KY. R~;v. STAT. AN'-f. § 525.070 
(West 2006); l\IE. REV. STAT. tit.. 20-A, § ();)ii49(2)(c) (Supp. 201:3); 
.1\lD. CODE AN~ .. EDUC. § 7-424(a)(2) (\Vest 2012); .1\liCII. Coi\JP . 
LAWS A~l\·. § 380.1310b(8)(b) (West 2013): .1\l!N~. STAT. Al\·N. 
§ l21A.03l (e) (West, 2008); :vrrss. Com; AN:'-1. § 37-11-67(1) (Supp. 
201:3): l\Io. AJ\N. STAT. § 160.775(2) (West 2010): ~EV. REV. STAT. 
§ :388.122 (Supp. 201:3); l\.H. REV. STAT. A~!\. § 19:3-F::3 (2011); N . .J. 
STAT. AN~. § 18A:37-14 (\Vest 2013); N.Y. EDL'C. LAW § 11(7) 
('.\fcKinney Supp. 20'14); N.C. C~:N. SrAT. § 1'!5C-407.15(a) (20'11); 
l\.D. c~;l\T. Corn;§ 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2013); Ol<LA. S'L'A'L'. tit. 70, § 
24-lOO.:l(c)(l) (Supp. 201:3); OR. REV. STAT. § :3:39.:351(2) (2011); 24 
PA. CONS. STAT. Al\·N. § 13-1303.1-A(e) (\Vest Supp. 2014); lLl. GEl\' . 
LAWS § 16-21-33(a)(1) (Supp. 2013); S.C. CODE Al\·N. § 59-63-120 
(Supp. 20B): T~:NX Com; AN'<. § 49-6-4502(a) (20B): T~:x. Enuc. 
CoDE A~!\. § :37.08:32(a) (\Vest. Supp. 2014); UTAH CoDE AJ\N. § 5:3A-
11a-102 (LcxisNcxis Supp. 201:3); VA. CoDE A:-<1\·. § 22.1-276.01 (A) 
(Supp. 2014); \VASIL REV. CoDE § 28A.300.285(2) (2012): W. VA. 
Com: A'-fl\. § 18-2C-2(a) (Lexisl\exis 2012); Vv'Yo. STAT. Al\N. § 21-4-
312(a) (2011). 
27. l\EV. REV. STAT.§ :388.122 (Supp. 201:3). 
28. E.g., 105 iLL. COMP. STAT. Al\'N. 5/27-23.7(:3) (\Vest 2012). 
29. Tb:-<l\. CODE A:-<l\. § 49-6-4502(a)(:{) (2()1;{). 
30. Kq., 105 ILL. Ccn,!P. STAT. AN:-<. 5/ 27-23.7(b)(3) (\Vest 2012) (pro-
hibiting bullying that, among other things, "substantially [interferes] 
with the student's or students' academic performance"). 
31. Kq., l'vfTCH. COI\IP. LAWS AJ\·N. § 380.1310b(8)(b)(iv) (\Vest 2013) 
(prohibiting· bullying that causes, a.mong· other things, a "substantia.! 
disruption in. or substantial interference >vith, the orderly operation of 
the school"). 
32. TmVA ConR § 280.28(2)(b) (2011). 
10
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conduct. that "creates an objectively hostile school environment." and, 
among other things, "has the effect of substantially· interfering with 
the student's ability to participate in or benefit from the services, 
acti vi tics, or pri vilcgcs provided by a school..,,;:; In 1\ cw Hampshire, 
the bull,ying statute prohibits bullying, which is defined as including 
"a pattern of incidents'' that "substantially disrupts the orderly 
operation of the school. ":>4 
ln most (h,renty-five) states, c::yberbull,ying laws are simply 
additions to or variations of these general definitions of bullying.''·" In 
these states, the relevant language typically specifics that. bullying can 
happen by "electronic,'' among other, means.3' ; Sixteen states, 
hmvever, have separate statutory or regulatory definitions of 
cybcrbullying.'" These definitions arc very similar to the general 
;);). 10\VA CoDE § 280.28(2) (b) (2011). In Iowa, as in other states wit.h this 
harassment-like component to the cyberbullying statutes, the impact a t 
school is not dearly subjective or objective. Given the lack of clarity 
about the stfl.nclard, the determination at the school level, then, is lef't to 
the school. l'vlcaning, then, that the determination for practical purposes 
is subjective. 
34. 1\.H. REV. STAT. A:-~i\. § 193-F:3(1) (2011). 
35. ALA. Com; § 16-28B (2012): AnK. Com; AN:'-1. § 6-18-514 (2009); 
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 22-:32-10!).1 (2012); DEL. CoDE AN:--r. tit. 14, 
§ 41121) (Supp. 2012): GA. CODE Al\·N. § 20-2-751.4 (2012): lDAIIO 
CODE Al\·N. § 18-917A (2006); 105 lLL. CO.\!P. STAT. Al\·N. 5/ 27-23 .7 
(West 2012); TNn. Com: A:'-1:'>1. § 20<~3-8-0.2 (West Supp. 2014); TO\VA 
CoDE§ 280.28 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. AN:'>~.§ 17:41().1;) (Supp. 2014); 
:t-.JD. CoDE A:'>li\., EDn:. § 7-424 (West 2012); :vircH. Co:v!P. LAws 
AN:-~. § 380.1310b (\Vest 2013); J'vlrss. CODE AKN. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 
2013); :rvJo. AN:'-1. STAT. § Hi0.775 (West. 2010); N.J. STAT. A:'>ll\. 
§ 18A:37-14 (\Vest. 2013); 1\.C. G~<;:'-1. SlAT.§ lliiC-407.15 (2011); :'-J'.D. 
CE:--rT. C oDE § 15.1-Hl-17 (Supp. 201:3); OHio REv. CoDE AN:'>~. 
§ 3313.666 (LexisNexis 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.3 (Supp. 
2013); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. Al\'N. § 13-1303.1-A (\Vest Supp. 2014); 
S.C. Com; A:'>ll\. § 59-G:~-120 (Supp. 2013); S.D. Com1•1~<;n LAWS§ 13-
;)2-15 (Supp. 201;)); TEX. Emrc. CoDE A:'>IK. § :n.o8:32 (West Supp. 
2014); VT. STAT. AN:'>~. tit.. 16, § 11 (Supp. 201:3); VA. CoDE Al\·N. 
§ 22.1-276.01 (Supp. 2014). 
3fi. E.g., Dl'L Com; AN:--.r. tiL 14, § 4112D(1) (Supp. 2012) (defining 
bullying as "any intentional \Vrittcn, electronic, verbal, or physical act 
or actions against. another student"). 
:n. CAL. Em;c. CODE§ 48900(r) (\Vest Supp. 2014); Col\·N. GE:-~. STAT. 
AN:--.r. § 10-222d (Supp. 2014); FLA. STAT. ANX § 100fi.147 (West Supp. 
2014); HAW. ConE H. § 8-19-2 (Lexi;;Ncxis 2014); KAK. STAT. AN:'>~. 
§ 72-8256 (Supp. 201:3); :\IE. R EV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (Supp. 2013); 
!l'iASS. GE:-1. LAW'S eh. 71, § :no (\VPBt Supp. 2014); J\liN:-1. STAT. 
AN:--.r. § 121A.Ofi95 ('t."est 2008); NE.v. REV. STAT. § 388.12:::1 (Supp. 
2013); N.H. REV. STAT. Al\N. § 193-F::::I (2011); N.M. Code R. 
§ 6.12.7.7 (Lcxisl\exis 2014); :'-J'.Y. Enuc. LA\V § ll (1\TcKinncy Supp. 
2014); OR. H.EV. STAT. § :3:39.351 (2011); lU. GEl\'. LAWS § 16-21-:3:3 
11 
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definitions provided by bullying laws, but they detail the various 
electronic means b,y which c:y·berbull,ying can happen.'1~ 
As noted in the Introduction, all of the states \Vith cyberbullying 
laws authorize schools t.o monitor students' online and electronic 
activity. I\ one, however, do so explicitl,y. Instead, the:r implicitly 
a.llmv schools to engage in surveillance of students' online and 
electronic activity by authorizing or requiring that schools discipline 
students for electronic acts that constitute bullying.'1!1 To discipline for 
cyberbullying, the schools have to know whether it happens, and the 
cybcrbullying laws arc silent. regarding how schools might go about. 
discovering the prohibited conduct. Knowing whether c,yberbullying is 
happening can be a tricky business. VVith more traditional physical or 
verbal bullying, as well as other discipline problems, schools typically 
know about it because either it occurs in front of a teacher or other 
school staff or students report incidents of it. The stereotypical bully, 
for example, might. t.hrcat.cn a student in school and then physically 
assault the student behind the school after class lets out for the day. 
The fight could easily dra.w attention and noise, alerting school staff 
and allowing them t.o intervene. Even if school staff did not. know 
about the bull:y·ing, they might likely see evidence of it in the physical 
bruises of the involved students. 
Conversely, cybcrbullying can easily occur without. the school ever 
knowing about it, absent any student reporting, and the evidence of it 
is not very obvious or accessible. Unlike physical or verbal bullying, 
electronic acts cannot be readily· seen or heard. Therefore , if a school 
is relying on the traditional 1neans of knmving about student 
discipline issues-hearing or seeing them-the school will not know 
about the cyberbullying unless a student chooses to report it. Also 
unlike verbal or physical bullying, cyberbullying occurs in a nebulous 
time and space a way from the eyes and cars of anyone other than the 
bully· (or bullies) and the target. The time is nebulous because unlike 
in-person bullying, the electronic bullying message can be composed 
and sent at a Lime before, even significantly before, the target receives 
(Supp. 2013); TEN!\·. ConE A:-ll\·. § 49-6-4502 (2013); UTAII ConE Al\·N. 
§ ;)3A-lla-102 (LexisNexis Supp. 201::1). 
38. E.g., FLA. SrAT. Al\N. § 100u.l47(3)(b) (vVest Supp. 2014) (defining 
cybcrbullying as, among other things, "bullying through the usc of 
technology or any electronic communication, which indudes, but is not 
limited to, any transfer of signs, signals, writing. images, somHls, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmit.t.ed in w·hole or in part by a wire, 
radio, clcct.romn.gnct.ic syst-em, photoclcctronic system, or phototopicn.l 
system, including·, but not limited to, elect-ronic mail, Internet. 
eornrnunications, instant messages, or facsimile cornrnunieations"). 
39. E.g., South Carolina calls for "consequences and appropriate remedial 
actions for persons committing acts of ... bullying." S.C. ConF- AN:'i' . 
§ ii9-63-140(D)( 4) (Supp. 201:3). 
12
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the message. The message can sit waiting in the target's e-mail in box 
or ou a smartphone or other electrouic device for hours. Similarly, the 
space in \Vhich the bullying occurs is nebulous because the target can 
compose and send t.hc bullying message from one location and the 
victim cau receive it iu a vv'lwll:y differeut locatiou. ludeed, eveu the 
physical location of the message can be unclear. C nlike some more 
traditional forms of bullying or harassment. such as poison-pen lcl.l.crs, 
cyberbull:yiug lacks tangibility. lt exists somewhere, perhaps ou a 
server sonle\vhere, in the cloud, or else\vhere. The time and space in 
which t.hc bullying occurs, therefore, is almost. irrelevant to its impact.. 
Regardless of where aud \Vhen the bullyiug occurs, ouce the victim 
receives the 1nessage, its impact can be felt. Yet, the nebulous nature 
of it.s t.imc and space occurrence docs create difficult.ics for knowing 
about, accessiug evidence of, aud therefore addressiug the bullying 
behavior. If a student sends a bullying message to another student at 
school, but. the message is not. rccci vcd until the target is at home in 
the late hours of the uight, the school may have difficulty both 
knovving it happened and administering the requisite discipline.40 
One obvious way to overcome t.hcsc difficulties and determine if 
studeuts are eugaged iu cyberbullyiug is for schools, to the extent the 
cyberbullying l<.nvs allow it, to develop or acquire a system to monitor 
their students' online and electronic activity vvhcrcvcr and whenever 
it occurs. Siuce the cyberbull:ying laws do uot prohibit such 
surveillance, the statutes implicitly aUmv the schools to monitor 
studeuts' ouliue aud electnmic activity, a.nd schools, as discussed 
belmv, are starting to grab t.his implicit authorit.y to conduct 
surveillance of all students' online and electronic activit.y.41 
To au exteut. schools' embrace of this implicit authority is 
understandable. Of the ways to determine if students are engaged in 
cybcrbullying and therefore should be disciplined, a comprehensive 
surveillance system is probably· the most effective and efficieut meaus . 
Keeping electronic tabs on all students' online and elect.ronic activity 
works to roo(. out cyberbullying because it involves collecting 
iuformatiou on all studeuts' ouliue and electronic activity, includiug 
any cyberbullying. It also therefore serves as the \Vay to prevent a 
tragic suicide due t.o unaddressed cyberbullying. 
To be sure, there a.re alteruatives to this comprehensive 
surveillance method. Schools could confiscate all st.udents' electronic 
devices t.o determine whcther they arc engaged in cyberbullying. 
40. S.C. Com: A:-<K. § 59-63-140(fl)(4) (Supp. 2013). 
41. Schools often cannot discipline students under the~e la'v~ >vithout ~orne 
impact of the bullying being felt at ~chool, but they can nonethele~~ 
monitor students' online and electronic activity more broadly in an 
effort to determine if the activity creates the requisite discipline-
invoking impa.ct.. 8ce infra Pa.rt T.D.3. 
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Setting aside any potential Fourth Amendment problems with this 
method, this option is simpl,y impractical in that it would require 
schools to review students' online and electronic activity one by one .4 2 
In addition to being impractical, the method would be only partially 
effective at best.. With applications like Snapchat. that. can erase 
1nessages shortly after they are sent and received, confiscating the 
physical electronic devices may not result in schools' actually seeing 
and knowing about. the bullying messages. u 
Alternatively, schools could follow students on social media.. Like 
the confiscation method, this method is similarly inefficient and likely 
ineffective. 11 It. is inefficient because it 1vould be difficult. to know all 
the social 1nedia platforms on which to follow students, and it \vould 
be challenging at best to follow every student on all social media. It is 
also likel~r ineffective because students know when someone starts t o 
follovv them on social 1nedia..45 The bull~r vvho 1na.kes an~r effort to not 
get caught could just choose a different form of social media-one on 
which he or she is not being follmved b:y school staff-to carry· out the 
bullying activity. 
Schools could also just rely on the traditional method of student. 
reporting. They could wait. for students who are subjected t o 
cyberbullying to inform then1 of the problem and then intervene. 
However, this option is similarly indTective and inefficient if schools 
are working to reall,y root out all c:y·berbullying. H; C nless every student 
who experiences cyberbullying reports it to the school, the school vvill 
not. be able to knm:v about all the cyberbull:ying that is happening 
among it.s students. If one missed instance results in a suicide or 
suicide attempt, the school will face enormous criticism and scrutiny. 
Instead, schools that are confronting these challenges hea.d-on are 
opting for more global and efficient methods of monitoring of 
students' online and electronic activity when they have the authority 
to do so. As explained below. most of the states have this implicit 
authority, and some schools are therefore starting to employ 
42. This is not to say that these Fourth Amendment concerns arc 
insignificant. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that police 
sean:hes of cell phones, even incident to arrest, require a warrant. ll-iley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 247:::1 (2014). 
43. Snapchat G1iidc .for Pa.rcnt8. S'<APCHAT http: / / w,vw.snapcha.t.com/ 
static files / parents.pdf (;.Jay 1, 2014). Theoretically a school could still 
see an infringing Snapchat if the student screenshot the message before 
it disappeared. 
44. Sec ThomHs & lVTurphy, supra note 2: SenguptH., .mpra note 16. 
4;'). 81'-e, 1'-.g., TWITTER, lNC., FA.Qs Aliont Following, https: / / support. 
twitter.com/ artides/ 14019-l'aqs-about-lollowing (last. visited .June 24, 
2014). 
46. Sec supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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companies, such as Gco Listening and Safe Outlook Corporation, to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance of student.s. 17 Acconling to the 
president of Geo Listening, Chris Frydrych, the company's service 
works by looking for "kcyvvords and sentiments" on public posts by 
students. 111 Instead of providing a service, Safe Outlook Corporation 
sells a product called CompuGuardian, \Vhich allows for keyword 
searches of students' online activity.49 David .Jones, the president of 
Safe Outlook Corporation, was quoted as saying that by ut.ili~ing 
CompuGuardian, "you can identify a student, and you can jmnp into 
their activity logs and sec cxact.ly what they've typed, exactly where 
they've gone, exactly what. t.he:y·'ve done, and it gives you some 
history that you can go back to that child and use some disciplinary 
action.""0 
I\ ot. only are schools and school districts paying large sums for 
these services and products, but the companies also expect the sales 
and usc of their products and services to grow. In 2013, Glendale 
School District. in California paid Ceo Listening more than $'10,000 to 
1nonitor students' social 1nedia postsY As of October 2013, at least 
two school districts and three schools were paying Safe Outlook 
Corporation between $'1,000 and $9,000 per year for t.he use of its 
technology, and the company's president "'expects the number of 
schools participating to go up."'" Frydrych of Gco Listening expected 
to have 3,000 schools paying for his company's services by the end of 
2013.3'1 
B. Thn;e Levd8 of S'nrveillance Autluwdy 
In Glendale, California. the school district has interpreted its 
povvcr under the cyberbullying statutes to allow it to conduct. the 
surveillance it pa:<.rs Ceo Listening to do because the Califoruia 
cyberbullying statute implicitly authorizes surveillance of students .54 
Although the majority of cyberbullying statutes arc like California's 
in that. they irnplieit.l:r authorize unlimited or nearly unlimited 
surveillance of students' online and electronic activity. not all states 
47. Sec Sengupta, supra note 16; \Vallace, supra note 16. 
48. Sengupta, 8upm note 16. 
49. ·wallace, supra note Hi. 
00. !d. 
,")1. ld. 
52. Id. 
03. Scngupt;1, swJra note I G. 
;)4. CAL. ED. CODE § 48900(r) (\Vest Supp. 2014) (providing authority for 
schools to punish cyberbullying and therefore implicitly authori;dng 
schools to monitor students' electronic activity to discover the 
prohibited electronic acts). 
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go so far. Some states require at lea.<>!. some nexus to school. \Vhilc the 
use of this surveillance authority is very new, and the authority for it. 
has not been plainly articulated or delineated, the clearest parameters 
for the implicit authority to monitor students' online and electronic 
activit.)r lies in the authority to uncover cyberbullying behavior for 
which schools have the authority to discipline students. The nexus 
required by some states' lavvs is required in order to have authority to 
discipline. Although the cyberbull:ying la.v.m' silence on the authority 
to conduct electronic surveillance of students leaves open the question 
of whether even more snrvcillance by schools is permitted, the schools' 
best argument that their surveillance is authori:.~ed lies in their need 
to uncover cyberbullying behavior for which they have the authority 
to then discipline students. 
1. Authorizing School Surveillance of Student. Online 
and Elel:t.ronic Activity If It Occurs at School or a Specific 
School-Related Event or Activity 
Fifteen states require schools to have a substantial nexus to 
school in order to discipline students for cyberbullying.v' These 
55. These states are: Alabama, lowa, Louisiana, _\lississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, l\ew l\ifexico, Korth Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma , 
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and ViFyoming. ALA. Con~; § 16-28R 
(2012); IOWA CODE§ 280.28 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. AN~.§ 17:416.1:3 
(Supp. 2014): tvllSS. CODE Al\'N. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 2013); .1\'Eil. HEV. 
STAT. § 79-2,137 (Supp. 2013): NEV. HEV. STAT. § 388.135 (Supp. 
2013); N.:vr. Com: R. § 6.12.7.7 (Lexisl\exis 2014): N.C. GK'L STAT.§ 
llDC-407.15 (2011); N.D. CEJ\"T. CoDE§ 15.1-1!)-17 (Supp. 201:3); OHio 
REV. CoDE AKN. § :.t31:3.66G (Lexi~Nexis 201:3); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70 , § 
24-100.4 (Supp. 2013); OR. H.EV. STAT. § 339.351 (2011); S.C. CoDE 
AN'<. § 59-u3-120(1)(a) (Supp. 20'13); T~;x. Em.c. Com; A'.fl\. § 
37.0832 (West Supp. 20'14); WYO. STAT. Al\N. § 21-4-312 (2011). 
Orep;on also authorizes ~chools to di~cipline for cybcrhullyinp; if it 
happens on property adjacent to school property. OR. Hr:v. STAT. § 
339.351 (2011). An argument could be made that Louisiana falls into 
the "no nexus" category of states because it allows schools t.o discipline 
for cyherhullyinp; and bullying "at a school-~ponsored or ~chool-rclated 
function or activity," which could include activitie~ such a~ a student 
doing homework in her bedroom. LA. l~.EV. STAT. A:-~1\'. 
§ 17:416.13(C)(2)(a) (Supp. 2D14). That. said, the specificity with which 
the st.at.ut.es delineate where st.udent.s can be when schools have 
authority to discipline for bullying·, including "on school property, at a 
school-sponsored or school-related function or activity, in any school bus 
or van, at any designated school bus stop, in any other school or private 
vehicle used Lo transport students to and from schools, or any school-
sponsored act-ivity or event," suggests the statute requires something 
more tlH>n virtun.lly no nexus to school. Td. The ;;nme is nl;;o true for 
South Carolina's statute, >vhich defines "school" ('vhere bullying for 
which schools can discipline can happen) as "in a classroom, on school 
premises, on a school bus or other school-related vehicle, at an official 
school bus stop, at a school-sponsored activity or event whether or not 
it is held on school premises, or at another program or function where 
16
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"activity nexus'' states authorize schools to discipline students for 
eyberbullying it if happens in school or when the students are 
physically on schoolhouse property.56 In addition, some of these states 
provide schools with the authority to discipline students for 
eyberbullying if it happens outside the ph:y·sical school building or off 
the physical property of the school but still at school-sponsored 
acti vi tics:" 'More specifically, several states allow schools to discipline 
for cyberbullying that happens on the school bus.··~ Several more 
states expressly allmv schools to discipline for cyberbullying if it 
happens on any school or school-provided transportation, school bus 
or otherwise.·-"' Certain states call on schools to discipline students for 
cyberbullying that happens at school bus stops.f>n One state, 
Louisiana, provides for student discipline if cyberhullying happens on 
the way to or from school no matter the t,ype or ownership of the 
transportation used.m ~ine states call on schools to discipline students 
for cyhcrhullying that happens a(. any school-sponsored or sanctioned 
events.t;2 
Because schools in these activity nexus states cannot discipline 
students without. that nexus, the schools have a relatively weak 
the sehoul is responsible fur the child." S.C. CoDE Ai\N. § 59-63-
120(1)(a) (Supp. 2013). 
;)6. Id. 
57. ld. 
58. See e.g., ALA. Com; § 16-28B (2012); rvrrss. Com; AJ\J\. § 37-11-67 
(Supp. 2013): 'h;v. R~:v. STAT. § :~88.135 (Supp. 2013); 1\.Y. Emrc:. 
LAW § 11 (!VIcKinncy Supp. 2014); ~.C. GEN. STAT. § 1L)C-407.15 
(2011); Omo H.Ev. Com; A:>~:>~.§ 3313.666 (Lexisl\exis 2013). 
59. See e.g., LA. rr~:v. S'L'A'L'. AJ\N. § 17:416.13 (Supp. 2014); ~~;R. R~:v. 
STAT. § 79-2,137 (Supp. 2013); N.:.vr. Corw R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 
2014); 1\.D. CE:>~T. CoDE§ 15.1-HJ-17 (Supp. 201;)); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 339.351 (2011); S.C. CODE AM. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 2013); TEX. 
EDUC. Com:: A:>~K. § 37.0832 (\Vest Supp. 2014); CTAII CODE AN:>~. 
§ 53A-11a-201(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); \Vvo. STAT. A:'>IJ\. § 2l-4-
:n2 (2011). 
60. See e.g., N._\L Code H. § 6.12.7.7 (Lexisl\exis 2014); OR. H.EV. STAT. 
§ :3;)9.:351 (2011); S.C. CODE A:>~K. § ;)9-63-120 (Supp. 2013); UTAII 
CODb AN:'-1. § 53A-lla-201(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 201:::1). 
61. LA. REV. STAT. AN:>~. § 14:40.7(C) (Supp. 2014) ("An offense com-
mitted pursuant to the provisions of this Section may be deemed to 
have been committed where the cormnunication was originally sent, 
originally received, or originally viewed by any person."). 
62. ALA. Com; § l6-28n (2012); LA. REV. STAT. AN:\1. § 14:40.7 (Supp. 
2014); _\liSS. CODE AN:>~. § :37-11-67 (Supp. 201:3); -"lEV. HEv. STAT. 
§ :388.12:3 (Supp. 201:3); N._\L CODE lL § 6.12.7.7 (Lexisl\,"exis 2014); 
1\.Y. Em; c. LAW§ 11 (lvlcKinney Supp. 2014); OHIO RE.v. CODE AN:'-1. 
§ 331:3.666 (LcxisNcxis 2013); S.C. Com: AN:'-1. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 
2013); TEX. Em:c. ConE A:>~:'-1. § :37.0832 ('West Supp. 2014). 
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argument that they ha vc authority to monitor students' online or 
electronic: activity absent such a link. \Vhile a lack of an,y explicit 
authorization to conduct surveillance is not the same as a prohibition , 
the schools in these activity nexus states have no valid basis for 
conducting surveillance of students 1vhen they cannot discipline for 
the conduct they uncover. For example, if a student is at horne using 
a smartphonc in his or her bedroom, and the smartphonc usc has no 
relationship to school, the student cannot be disciplined at school for 
a.n~r online or electronic activit~r conducted at that time. Therefore, 
schools have no foundation for monitoring students to determine if 
that conduct warrants discipline . 
.!\ e1v :'vlexico is an example of an activity nexus state. ~e\v 
'Mexico's definition of bullying is contained in its administrative code. 
I'iew J\lexic:o Administrative Code Section 6.12.7.7 prohibits bull,ying, 
including bullying by "electronic expression.'' However, it li1nits its 
definition of bullying to that which occurs "in the school, on school 
grounds, in school vehicles, at a designated school bus top, or at 
school activities or sanctioned events. "63 Outside these activities. 
schools in I\ cw Mexico cannot discipline for cybcrbullying and 
therefore have scant reason to conduct surveillance on students 
outside these contexts. 
2. Authorizing School Surveillance of Students' Online and Electronic 
Activity Tf lt Ha.s a 1'\exus to School Equipment or Networks 
In seven states, the cybcrbullying statutes require a less 
substantial nexus to school in order to discipline for and therefore 
1nonitor students' online and electronic activity.6• In these "ovmership 
nexus" states, the schools can discipline students for cybcrbullying if 
it is done using a school computer, school electronic equipment, a 
school netvmrk. or other school property.6" Tvm of these states, 
Kansas and Rhode Island, prohibit cybcrbullying through the usc of 
any school property, 1:vhich of course could include school computers 
or net.1vorb.66 The rest prohibit cyberbullying if a student woes either 
school networks or equipment to do it.1;7 In these states, if a student is 
63. 1\.tvl. CoDE H .. § 6.12.7.7(A) (LexisNexis 2014). 
G4. These states are: Arizona, Delmvare, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, rvlichigan, 
and Rhode Island. ARTZ. REV. STAT. AN:-.~. § 15-341 (2012): DEr.. ConE 
AN:-.~. tit .. 14, § 4112D (2011); GA. ConF AN:-.~. § 20-2-751.4 (West 
2012); 105 1LL. COMP. STAT. Al\'N. 5/ 27-23.7 (\Vest 2012); KA~. STAT. 
AN~. § 72-8256 (Supp. 2013); :VhcH. Cm.u•. LAWS AN:'-1. § 380.1310b 
(West 2014); ILL GEl\. LAWS§ lG-21-:);{ (Supp. 2013). 
60. !d. 
66. KAN. STAT. A~l\·. § 72-8256 (Supp. 201:3); lLl. GEN. LAWS§ 16-21-:3:3 
(Supp. 2013). 
67. Amz. REv. STAT. AN:-.~. § I.J-341 (2013); DRL. ConE AN:-.~. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D (2012); GA. Com; ANN. § 20-2-7,)1.4 (2014); 105 1LL. Co:-1P. 
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a!. home using a school-issued and -owned tablc1. to engage in 
cyberbullying, then the school can discipline for it. However, the 
school cannot discipline for cyberbullying if the student is at home 
but using a personal tablet or other device and a private network. 
Because the authority to discipline is so limited, the surveillance 
authority is too, at least implicitly. If a student is not using school 
equipment or a school network, the schools have no authority to 
discipline and therefore little t.o no authority t.o monitor students ' 
online and electronic activity. 
Illinois has such an ownership nexus statutc.c;' In Illinois the 
definition of bullying and prohibition against. it is contained in it.s 
statutory code. Illinois Compiled Statute Section 105-5/ 27-23.7 states 
that. "[n]o student. shall be subjected t.o bullying." It goes on t.o define 
cyberbullying as that which occurs "through the transmission of 
infonna.tion from a school computer, a. school computer netvvork, or 
other similar electronic school equipment. "W In Illinois, then, since the 
schools can only discipline for cyberbullying that occurs through the 
use of school equipment or networks, they have little, if any, 
legitimate basis for monitoring students' online and electronic activity 
when that activity is not conducted through the school equipment. or 
networks. 
\Vhile it might seem that t.hc school equipment or nct.work 
limitation on these schools' surveillance authority is significant, in 
actuality these states still authorize schools to conduct very broad 
surveillance of students that. goes beyond the time and space of school 
itself. First, the schools could, if t.hey \Vere so inclined, conceivably go 
beyond t.hc surveillance authority implicitly provided in t.hcsc laws 
because the la\vs lack an}r mechanism for controlling schools' use of 
their authority. The hnvs have no cause of action or other device to 
hold schools accountable if schools exceed any implicit. surveillance 
authority in the laws.'0 Therefore, if schools choose t.o monitor 
st.udents' online and electronic activity conducted \Vith school 
equipment or nchvorks, and t.hcy choose or allow surveillance t.o bleed 
into student. activity done without the use of school equipment or 
networks, students have little, if any, means to stop them. 71 
STAT. G/27-2:3.7 (\Vest. 2012); J\iJJCH. Co~rP. LAWS ANN. § :380.1:3l0b 
(West 201:3). 
68. 10,") iLL. CoMP. STAT. i5/ 27-2:3.7(a) (\Vest 2012). 
69. 105 ILL. COJ\H'. STAT. 5/27-23.7(a)(3) (West 2012). 
70. Sec in.fra Pitrt TTT.TI.3. 
71. Of course, this is true of most statutes providing the state with 
authority but. not offering enforcement mechanisms w·hen the state 
exceeds that authority. Thus, the need exists for a cause of action to 
limit. the misuse of state authority. Sec infra Part TV.A. 
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Also, if a student chooses to engage in online or electronic activity 
at. home and after school but uses school equipment or networks to do 
it, then the school can still monitor the student's online and electronic 
activity even though it occurs in a time and space beyond the school 
and school day. \Vhile it. is true that students could circumvent a 
school's surveillance authority by using their own equipment and 
networks, for some students this circum vcntion is not so easy or 
simple. Consider low-income students. They are less likely than high-
income students to o\vn a computer and much less likely to o\vn a 
tablet.' " So while students from high-income families can escape school 
surveillance b:r using their mvn equipment or uehvorks, low-income 
students cannot so readily escape it. The ovmership nexus limitation 
on the schools' surveillance authority, therefore, really only protects 
privileged students who need not rel.r ou school equipment to access 
electronic data. 
In addition, given that the student population in the public 
schools is increasingl:y low-income, the ownership nexus is increasingly 
less of a limitation on school surveillance authority.i3 In seventeen 
states the majority of st udcnts in public schools arc low-income, and 
for them, it is likely that school equipment and networks are their 
only regular access to certain electronic data and equip1nent.'4 Indeed, 
many schools, in part out. of recognition of these changing 
demographics, are gnrmg out t.eclmology to students, including 
equipment like iPads, as additional learning tools."'• As a result. 
72. In the lcnve~t income households (those earning less than 8:30,000 per 
year), only 7:3 percent. own a computer versu~ 81 percent. of the highe~t. 
income households (tho~e earning more than $75,000 per year) mvning a 
computer. l'vlary :rvlaclden et al., Teens and Technology 2013, PEW 
RF.SF.ARCH l'\TF.RNF.T PROJECT at 6 (:.'vlar. 13, 20'13), http:// www. 
pewinternct .org/201:3 /0:3/ 1:3 / main- findings-5 j. Income is very predictive 
of owning a tablet, with only 15 percent of teens in the lowest income 
households compared to 31 percent of teens in the highest income 
households owning a tablet. Jd. 
7:3. Steven Suit.t.s, A New JHa,jority: Low Income Students in the South and 
Nat·ion, SOUTHJ.<:n.N EDCCAl'ION FL:.\D 8 (Oct. 2013), http:/ j wwv·:. 
~outherneducation.orgjgetattadnnent/Obc70ce1-d375-4ff6-8340-f9b3452 
eeD88 /A-New-~Iajority-Lmv-Income-S L udents-in-Lhe-South-an.aspx 
(providing statistics suggesting an increase in the number of lmv-income 
students). 
74. ld. at 2 tbl.1 (listing ~tates with "a majority of low income students in 
public schools" in 2011). 
70. The Los Angeles Cnificd School District lw.s fn.mously given out iPa.ds to 
all of its ~tudents, and other school ~ystems from Ohio to Alabama have 
done the same. Hmvard Blume St Steven Ceasar, As Schools Give 
Sludenls Compu.lers, Price of L.A.'s Program Slands Out., L.A. Tn .. IES , 
Dec. :rt, 2013, available at http:/ / www.lu.timcs.com/local/ln.-me-ipa.ds-
schools-201401 01-story.html#pagc=1. 
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students in owncrship nexus stat.es who do not have a personal tablet. 
device to use at. home, but. who 1vant t.o become familiar with this 
increasingly conunon technology,'6 will potentially be subjected to 
surveillance. To be fair, schools need some authority to control their 
own equipment, but this authorit:y does not require the broadening of 
surveillance authority. Schools have already abused this authority to 
control their own equipment. by committing serious intrusions into 
student. privac,y, including watching students in their homes and 
bedrooms through vvebcams in school-owned equipment.77 Instead, 
schools should employ available means other than comprehensive 
surveillance t.o control their devices. Schools, for example, can block 
websites and the ability of students to dovmload applications onto the 
devices.7' 
Finally, expecting students to forego tec:lmolog_y in order t.o avoid 
surveillance by schools is unrealistic and denies the allure technology 
has for young people. In t.heir book Liquid Su.Tvcillancc,'\J Zygmunt. 
Daurnan and David Lyon discuss the concept they call "liquid 
surveillance." An10ng other things, Bamnan and Lyon conceive of 
liquid surveillance as a lluid way of thinking of surveillance.w The 
authors point t.o the fluidity of surveillance in the consumer world, 
where consumption is the result of "the pleasurable seduction of 
consumers. '''1 They argue that. people submit. to surveillance and the 
attendant "loss of privac:r as a reasonable price for the wonders 
offered in exchange."8~ An example of such submission is the loyalty 
cards that offer discounts at grocery stores. ~: 1 JJauman & L~ron cite an 
76. According to a 2012 study by the Pew Research Center, 9!) percent. of 
teens are online, and 78 percent have a cell phone of some kind. See 
\Jadden et al., supra note 72, a(. 2-3. 
77. For example, in Pennsylvania, students accused a school official of 
activating· web cameras on school-owned laptops to watch students 
while they were at home. See Clarke, supra note 17. 
78. 'A'hile this solution has not. <11ways been perfect, a.s evidenced by Los 
Angeles Unified School District's initial iPad rollout. in which students 
got beyond the security controls quickly, the controls ultimately get 
fixed. Hmvard Blume, LA USJJ Halts Horne Use uf iJ>ad~ fur St·udent~ 
Afler Devices Hacked, L.A. Tl!v!ES, Sept. 25, 2013, available a/. 
ht Lp: // arUcles.laUmes.com/2013 / sep / 25 jlocaljla-me-ln-la usc!-ipad-hack-
201:3092[). 
79. [';)'GMUNT 13AU:\L\:\' & DAVID LYON, LIQUID St.:HVEILL\NCE 2 (201:3). 
80. Id. at. 4-5. 
81. !d. (l.t 121. 
82. Zygmunt Bauman, On NI'-VIT Being Alone Again, SOCiAL EUHOPE .J. 
.June 28, 2011, http:/ j www.social-europe.eu/ 2011/ 06/ on-never-being-
alone-again/ . 
83. TIAl.'MA.\ & LYON, supra note 79 a.t 128 (intcrna.l cita.tion omitted). 
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international study t.hat. Jound people "'either don't. know or don't. 
care' about the connections between the use of loyalty canis and 
profiling."54 People submit to the surveillance to get the benefits of 
the loyalt.y cards.~-, It is reasonable to expect that. surveillance of 
students b:y schools through school equipment. and networks is 
similarly liquid. Surveillance is liquid in the sense that it is hard for 
students to turn down technology's wonders in the name of privacy or 
security. This is probably especially true for low-income students. 
Even if the students could turn down equipment like school-issued 
tablets (and they may not be able t.o if their schoolwork must be done 
on a tablet) in order to forego surveillance, it. would be expecting a lot. 
of students to make that decision. Students live in a technology 
driven world where t.hey arc more likely to submit to the lures of 
technology, like free laptops and iPads from their school, than to 
sacrifice this equipment in the name of increased privacy:'t' To dismiss 
the surveillance authorized in these seven ownership nexus states 
under cyberbullying statutes as optional, then, is to ignore the 
strength of the technology's appeal and the ubiquity of its use. 
3. Authorizing School Surveillance of Student. Electronic Activity 
Without Any .\Texus to the School or Schooi-Helated Activities 
Tv,'ent~'-three states and the District of Columbia have statutes 
that allow for virtually unlimited surveillance of students' online and 
electronic activityY These ";~,ero nexus" laws implicit.l:y authori:.~e 
84. !d. 
8;'i. Id. 
86. See CBSI\E\VS, $610K Settlwwnt in School \Vebc:am Spy Ca.~e (Oct. 
2'1. 20'10), http:/ /www.cbsnews.comjnews/610k-settlement-in-school-
webcam-spy-case/ (noting that even after catching school officials using 
his webcam to view activities >vithin his bedroom, the spied-upon 
Harrington High School student "says his computer behaviors haven't 
c:hCJ.nged much. .''). 
87. These states arc Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 1\Iainc, .:Vlaryland, IVIassachusen.s, Tviinnesota, 
.\lissouri, I\ew Hampshire, I\ew .Jersey, f\:e,v York Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Vv'ashington, Vlest. Virginia, and the 
District. o[ Columbia. ARK. CODE A:'<l\. § 6-18-514 (2009); CAL. EDrrc. 
ConE § 48900 (West Supp. 2014); Cor.o. REv. S'T'A'T'. § 22-:32-109.1 
(2012); Co~l\'. GE~. STAT. A~l\'. § 10-222d(b)(16) (2010); FLA. ST:\T. 
AN~. § 1006.147 (\Vest Supp. 2014); H:\W. CODE H. § 8-19-2( 
(LexisNexis 2014); IDAHO CODE AN:'-1. § 18-917 A (2006); Il\D. CODE 
AN:-<. § 20-33-8-0.2 (\Vest Supp. 2014): IVIE. REV. STAT. 'T'I'T'. 20-A, 
§ 6004 (Supp. 201:3); ~In. ConE AN:-<., Enuc. § 7-424 (West 2012); 
!l'iAss. GEN. LAws A:-<K. cu. 7L § :no (\Vest Supp. 2014); .\lrl\·N. 
STAT. A:\N. §§ 121A.0695, 121A.O:::Il (West. 2008); ~VIo. A:'<l\. STAT. 
§ 160.775 ('\Vest 2010); :.r.H. REV. STAT. Al\N. § 193-F:4 (2011); I\ . .J. 
STAT. A:-<1\. § 18A:37-14 ('West 2014); K.Y. Enuc. LA\V § 11 
(;.1cKinney Supp. 2014); 24 PA. Co~s. STAT. AN~. § 1:3-1:30:3.1-A(d) 
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schools t.o monitor st.udent.s' online and electronic activity regardless 
of where or when it is conducted. For example, California's statute 
prohibits bullying by "electronic act,'' which act serves as grounds for 
suspension or expulsion of t.he student. when it. occurs.~~ \Vhile t.he 
statute discusses the acts of bull,ying in relation to school activities 
and attendance. in reality there is no limit in the statute on \Vhere or 
when the bullying can occur.8!J Because schools have t.he authority t.o 
punish bull:y·ing that occurs anywhere and at any time by electronic: 
act, they implicitly have the authority to search for and discover it 
whenever and wherever it. occurs.!Jo This int.crprct.at.ion provides t.hc 
authority for C len dale School District's use of Ceo Listening to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance of all of its students' online and 
electronic activityY1 
Other states are even more liberal than California in the broad 
grant of authority to schools to punish, and therefore monitor, 
st.udent.s' online and electronic act.ivit.y. Indiana and I\ew York arc 
two such states that exhibit the breadth of school authorit:y·.''2 Indiana 
prohibits bullying, including cyberbullying, by students "regardless of 
the physical location in which the bullying behavior occur[s]."!"1 :.Jew 
York defines bullying, including cyberbullying, to consist of certain 
activity that occurs "off school property."n4 Although the :.Jew York 
(West. Supp. 2014); S.D. Cormwn LAWS § 13-32-15 (Supp. 20'13); 
TEc-rl\·. CoDE ANc-r. § 49-6-4i}02 (Supp. 201:3); UTAH CoDE AI\·N. § G:3A-
lla-201(2) (Lexisl\exis Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. Al\'c-r. TIT. 16, 
§ ll(a)(32)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2013); \VASil. H.EV. CODE § 28A.300.285 
(2012); \V. VA. Com: § 18-2C-2 (Lexisl\exis 2012); D.C. Com; §§ 2-
L"i:iG.lH to 2-1G:3G.09. 
88. CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 48900(r) (\Vest Supp. 2014). 
89. !d. The subsequent. provision requires the a.ct.s enumerated in the seet.ion 
to be "related to a school aet.ivit.y or school a.t.t.endanee" bel'ore discipline 
can be ordered. § 48900(s) (\Vest Supp. 2014). However, many electronic 
activities can occur off school grounds and still be related to school 
activity. See, e.g .. ·infra note 122 and accompanying text. Il/loreover, the 
same provision spedfica.lly notes that the disdplin(l.b]e act. may occur "<1!. 
any time'' § 48900(s) (West Supp. 2014). The provision goes on to list 
period~ where thi~ activity may occur, all of viThich arc tied to the 
~chool's carnpu~, the school day, or travel to and frorn a ~chool­
sponsorecl activity. Id. However, the text explicitly notes that this list is 
inexhausUve. Id. 
no. Sec Neil l\if. Richards, The !Jimits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOl\lMS. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 357 (2011) (explaining why cornrnon law privacy torts 
have limit.ed utilit.y for redressing surveillance in the digital age). 
91. Sec supra Pn.rt T.A. 
92. 11\'D. CODE Al\'N. § 20-;);)-8-0.2 (\Vest Supp. 2014); 1\.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 11(7) (lvleKinney Supp. 2014). 
93. INn. ConE A:\N. § 20-33-8-13.5(b) (West. Supp. 2014). 
94. 1\.Y. Enuc. LA\V § 11(7) (:VlcKinncy Supp. 2014). 
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stat.ut.c, like many but. certainly not all iJ-, goes on to qualify the 
definition so that the off-campus bullying has to "create or foreseeably 
create a risk of substantial disruption vvithin the school enviromnent , 
where it. is foreseeable that the conduct, t.hrcat.s, intimidation, or 
abuse might reach school property," this qualification does nothing t o 
li1nit the surveillance authority of the scl:wol.% \Vhile schools in New 
York cannot discipline for bullying that. they learn about if it occurs 
off campus and creates no risk of substantial disruption or the threats 
reaching the schooL they can still monitor students' online and 
electronic acti vit.y occurring off-campus t.o delerrr1,1:ne if they can and 
should discipline students. Again, as with the c,yberbullying statutes 
1nore generally, surveillance allows schools to knmv about the activity 
for which they may need t.o discipline students regardless of vvhet.her 
they actually will have the authority to discipline for it. 
\Vhat can this enormous level of surveillance authority mean for 
students'! Imagine that two teenage, female students who at.tend t.he 
same school get into an argument during surnmer break. The 
argument takes place entirely over text and social 1nedia a.pps on the 
students' smart. phones. The argument. has nothing to do wit.h school, 
and it occurs during non-school, surnmer break hours. The messages 
the girls send and receive are only sent to and received from their 
homes and other non-school locations. Because their school dist.ricl. 
has CompuCuardian, hmvever, it learns of the argument as well as 
1nuch or all of the other information the students have posted 
electronicall:r, irrespective of its relationship to school or bullying. 
Through CompuGuardian, school staff 1nernbers are alerted to 
messages sent by one of t.hc girls that could be misinterpreted as 
cyberbullying. Although the girls resolve their argument and are 
friends again by the time school resumes after summer break, the girl 
who sent the misinterpreted message is suspended on t.hc first day of 
school for cyberbull:ying. The school's position is that the discipline is 
warranted because the summer argument could disrupt the school. In 
addition to the discipline, both girls arc now acutely aware that the 
school is monitoring their electronic communications, and they start 
95. California's sLaLut.e, for example, does not. require that the electronic 
bullying have an impacL at school in order Lo subjecL t.he bully to 
discipline. Dy authori;;~ing schools to discipline students for electronic 
ads. without limitation on where or when they occur, it allows 
California to monitor all students' electronic acts. lf those acts. for 
example, ''can be reasonably predicted to have t.he eiTed of ... placing 
a rea~onablc pupil ... in fear of harm to t.hn.t pupil\ ... person or 
property," then the school can ~uspend or expel the bully, regardless of 
>vhere the electronic act took place or 'vhere the student >vas when in 
fear of harm t.o her person or properLy. CAL. Em.: c. CODE § 48900(r) 
(~'est Supp. 2014); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
96. I\.Y. Enuc. LAW§ 11(7) (:VlcKinney Supp. 2014). 
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limiting what they say about anything the school could uncover and 
object. to, including messages about schoolwork. ln t.his easily 
inmgined hypothetical case, the school surveillance authority reaches 
beyond school space and time. 11. results both in the suspension of a 
girl for actions that she and her friend have since resolved and the 
school's collecting large amounts of data on these and other students, 
much of which has nothing to do with school or bullying. 
II. AN UNPR~-<;c~-<;m;NTED ExPANSION OF SCHOOL AuTHORITY 
C iven the novelt.Y of school authorit.:y under c:yberbullying laws t.o 
conduct surveillance of students' online and electronic activity, it is 
not snrprising that there is no doctrine on point regarding its limits. 
Thus, understanding hmv school surveillance authorit.:y reflects an 
expansion of traditional limits on school authority requires looking to 
other doctrinal restrictions on school authority to get. a sense of where 
courts have been willing to draw bo1mdaries. Overarching consti-
tutional limits on school authorit~, derive from First and Fourth 
Amendment student-speech and search doctrines. \Vhilc school 
surveillance authorit.Y does not fit squarely into either the First or 
Fourth Amendrnent school doctrine, it touches on elernents of both, 
thus providing relevant guidance on the limits of school authority. 
1\lore generally, Supreme Court doctrine on government surveillance 
provides smne guideposts to assess the limits of state and therefore 
school surveillance authority. 
A. The Limits u.f School Authority Under First Amendment Doctrine 
I. Schools' Expanded Authority to Hegulate Student Speech 
Schools generally have more authority than state actors under the 
Constitution to regulate student speech. That authority in some 
circmnstances extends beyond the ph:ysical boundaries of the school. 
Thus, First Amendment doctrine offers insight into where the courts 
have been willing to draw lines regarding school authority. In Tinker 
v. Des Moines independent Community Sehoul lJistrict,m t.he Supreme 
Court articulated both a willingness to protect student speech in 
school and recognized that students' First Amendment rights in 
school are not coextensive wit.h those rights in other contexts. The 
students in Tt:nker \Vere disciplined for \Vearing black armbands to 
school in protest. of the Vietnam \VarY~ They challenged the 
disciplinary action on First Amendment grounds.'~;) Famously 
pronouncing that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to 
97. Tinker v. De~ 1\'loines lndep. Sch. Dist., ;)9;) U.S. 50:3 (Hl69). 
98. Id. at. 504. 
99. Id. at 505. 
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freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate, "HX1 the Court. 
went on to find that student speech may nonetheless be limited if it 
"materially disrupts classvvork or involves substantial disorder or 
in va.<>ion of the rights of others. "101 Finding no such disruption, 
disonler, or invasion, the Court overturned the school disciplinar,y 
action as a. violation of the First A1nendment.102 
Because the students in Tinker wore their armbands in the school 
building, the standard articulated in that case for limiting student 
speech a. material and substantial disruption or invasion of the rights 
of others-applies in that specific scU.ing. Tinker did not have cause 
to address where the boundaries of "in school" begin and end. 
Therefore, while a school's increased authority to impmge on 
students' free-speech rights may or may not extend beyond the 
schoolhouse gate, Tinker· did not decide that issue. 10.1 
Other Supreine Court cases on student speech have done little to 
clarify the physical or temporal boundaries of school authority. In 
JJethd School District v. Fms(T, Iii I the Supreme Court found that 
schools have an increased authority, as compared to other state 
actors, to regulate students who make lewd speech in school .H'" In 
FrascT, a student 1va.s disciplined for making a vulgar speech at a 
school asse1nbly. 106 In finding that the school could regulate the 
speech, and therefore discipline the student, the Court again did nol. 
have reason to define where the boundaries of "in school" begin and 
end. As in Tinker, the student in question made the levvd speech in 
school, w7 and the holding \:Vas limited to those narrow facts. Though 
Fraser did not. address the physical boundaries associated with this 
increased authority to regulate student speech, Morse 1!. Frederick:'1~ 
later clarified that the authority to regulate students' lewd speech was 
100. Id. at ii06. 
101. ld. at 513. The Tinker opnnon also indicated that student speech 
" 'nwterially and substantblly int.erl'ere[s] with the requirements or 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the schooL .... "' I d. at 509 
(quoting Burnside v. Dyars, :36:3 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
102. id. at 514. 
10:::1. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 4L 48 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The Supreme 
Court has yet to speak on t.hc scope of a. school's a.ut.hority to rcgula.t e 
expression that ... does not oecur on sehool grounds or at a school-
sponsored event."). 
104. Bethel Sch. Dist.. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
I 05. !d. n.t 685. 
106. id. at 677 78. 
107. Id. 
108. :vrorsc v. Frederick, 551 U.S. :39:3 (2007). 
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limited to the physical school set.ting_HnJ In Aiorse, the majority stated 
that "[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech outside the school 
context, it vwuld have been protected. "11 0 
lvforsc and an earlier case, Hazelwood S'chool Dislricl v. 
Knhlmcier, 111 identified some specific: kinds of speech that can be 
regulated by the school regardless of \Vhether the speech physically 
occurs within the school setting. In KuhJrnc1:cr, the Court considered 
speech made by students in a school newspaper. 11 ~ lt concluded that 
schools generally have more authority than the state does to regulate 
school-sponsored student speech-such as speech made through a 
student newspaper.11 :1 ln A.f ursc v. Fn~dcTick, more famously knmvn as 
the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus'' case, the Court considered whether a. sign 
held up by a student at an off-campus, school-sponsored activity thai. 
could be interpreted to support illegal drug use could be regulated by 
the school. 114 It concluded that drug-supporting speech at school-
sponsored activities, off-campus or not, can be regulated by schoolsY' 
For school-sponsored speech and drug-supporting speech at school-
sponsored activities, the school boundaries are broader than the 
school boundaries for lewd speech: they extend beyond the physical 
location of the school. 
Since Fraser, Kuhlmet:er, and Morse apply specifically to le\vd 
speech, school-sponsored speech, and drug-supporting speech al. 
school-sponsored activities, they do not determine the boundaries of 
school authority in other contexts most relevantly \Vhen the school is 
conducting surveillance of students' online and electronic: activity 
outside the school. The federal appellate courts have therefore been 
left to grapple with applying the Tinker standard to address discipline 
of students' online speech when it does not occur in the school 
building or at. a school-related or sponsored event.116 The Circuits 
have developed two different standards for evaluating the extent or 
school authorit~r to discipline students for speech that occurs online 
and off-campus. One line of cases from the Second, 117 Third, 118 and 
109. !d. 405. 
110. Id. 
111. Hazehvood Seh. Dist. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260 (Hl88). 
112. Id. at 262. 
113. !d. a.t 273. 
114. Mor8e, 551 t:.S. at 397. 
115. Id. at 410. 
116. Doningcr v. Niehoff, 642 F.:3d 334, :346 (2d Cir. 2011) (n.pplying the 
T·inker standard to school discipline of online student activity that 
occurred off school properLy). 
117. Wisniewski v. Dd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (rega.rding a 
student's online insta.nt messa.g·c). 
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Eighth119 Circuits usc essentially the Tinker standard or a variation of 
it. The Second Circuit has articulated its test as one that permits 
schools to regulate vvhat might otherwise be protected speech made 
online and off-campus if the speech poses a rea.<>onably foreseeable risk 
that it 1vill both "come to the attention of school authorities and that 
it vvould '1naterially and substantially disrupt the vvork and discipline 
of the school. '"120 If the student speech meets this test, then the 
boundaries of the school extend beyond campus to virtually any place 
the speech occurs. The Second Circuit, in Doninger v. JWeho.ff1 ~ 1 
found such a rca.<>onably foreseeable risk when a student made a blog 
post at home, and the blog 1vas hosted on a 1vebsite '>Vholl.Y 
unaffiliated vvith school.122 The Court found that the blog post, which 
in vi ted students to protest. the school superintendent's decision 
regarding the date and location of a school jam fest nmsic event, 
"directly pertained to an event'' at school and "invited other students 
to read and respond to it by contacting school olTicials.''u:s Thus, the 
Court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the post 
would "reach ~chool property and have di~ruptive con~equences 
there. "U4 
The Fourth Circuit has a somewhat different approach for the 
standard for determining the breadth of ~chool authority to regulate 
students' off-campus and online speech. In K owalsk!: v. Berkeley 
County Schools, 12·•  a student created a J\lySpace page that was 
"largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellmv student."126 The student who 
118. J.S. v. Blue :rvrountain Seh. Disl., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011 ) 
(finding that a student who was suspended for creating a :rviySpace pap;e 
about her school principal on the weekend using her horne computer 
could not be disciplined >vithout violating the First Amendment). 
119. S . .J.Vv'. v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sc:h. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that. viThcre a student's blop; post was made at home and on a 
platform unaffiliated with the school, the "student speech that causes a 
substantial disruption is not protected"). 
120. vVi.sniew.ski, 494 F.3d at 38-39. 
121. Doninger. 642 F.:3d at ;)44. 
122. ld. at 348. 
12:). Id. 
124. !d. As v.rith the statutes that do not specify whether the determinn.tion 
of the impact on school is subjective or objective, the court did not 
clarify whether the assessment of the "disruptive consequences" at 
school would be subjective or objective. Id. Again, given that the 
determination is then largely left to the school at. the school level by 
school staff, it is for practical purposes a subjective determination made 
by those school staff members. Sl'.e .mpm note 31 and accompanying 
text.. 
125. Kown.lski v. Tkrkcley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.:3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
126. ld. at 567. 
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created t.he :\IySpace page was suspended from school for five days 
and challenged the suspension on First Amendment grouuds. 127 The 
Court concluded that the school could regulate student off-campus 
and online speech if the nexus between the speech and the school's 
pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the disciplinary 
action regulating the speech. 12·' In Kowalski, the Court found that the 
nexus requirement could be met by the material or substantial 
disruption test because although the Ivl:ySpace page was created at 
home, the student "kne\v that the electronic response would be, as it 
in fact. was, published beyond her home and could rea.<>onably be 
expected to reach the school or impact. the school euvironmeut."12!1 
Although acknmvledging that there is "a limit to the scope of a high 
school's interest in t.he order, safety, and well-being of its students 
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate,'' the 
Court declined to define that limit.1:30 It instead limited itself to 
finding that the student's speech on t.he :\JySpace page had a 
sufficiently strong nexus to those pedagogical interests. uJ 
In sum, schools' authority to regulate student speech is broader 
than that. of ot.hcr st.atc actors and at Limes can extend beyond t.he 
physical boundaries of schools. Supreme Court cases indicate that 
schools can regulate student speech even if it occurs off-ca1npus if it is 
school-sponsored speech or if it. is drug-supporting speech made at a 
school-sponsored activity·. m lu addition, in some Circuits, if there is a 
"reasonably foreseeable risk that the [speech will] come to the 
attention of school authorities" and create a material and substantial 
disruption in school.'".;; or if the regulation of the speech has a 
suiTiciently strong nexus t.o a school's pedagogical intcrests,m then 
student speech may be regulated b:y schools regardless of where and 
when it occurs. 
2. If Increased School Authority to Regulate Student Speech Is a Guide, 
Cyberlmllying Laws Expand School Authority 
Although t.he limits on school authority under student-speech 
cases provide a rough guide for t.he general limits on school authority, 
127. ld. The student additionally brought a challenge on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. Id. 
128. !d. at 573. 
129. ld. 
BO. Id. 
131. !d. 
132. Hazehvood Seh. Di~t. v. Kuhlrneier, 484 U.S. 260, 27:3 (Hl88); .\lorse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. :393, 410 (2007). 
B:::l. Wisniewski v. Bel. of Ecluc., 494 F.3cl 34, :::18 (2d Cir. 2007). 
134. Kowalski, 652 F.:3d at 573. 
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the surveillance authority of schools under cyberbullying statutes 
exceeds those limits. J3ecause of its sweeping nature, the surveillance 
of aU of students' online and electronic activity 'vhenever and 
wherever it occurs under cyberbullying statutes gathers information 
about students that has nothing to do with any foreseeable risk of a 
1na.terial or substantial disruption m school or any nexus to 
pedagogical intercstsY'-, The surveillance authority instead allows 
schools to learn an,y information about students that is posted online 
or electronically regardless of vvhether it has to do with school at 
allY" Accordingly, schools have the authority under the majority of 
cyberbullying statutes to obtain information about students regardless 
of its connection to school.'37 
Of conrse, surveillance of students under cyberlmllying statutes is 
distinct from the student-speech eases in one v>iay. The student-speech 
cases focus on the regulation of student speech by means of school 
clisciplincY8 The surveillance of students under cyberbullying statutes 
happens before the student discipline takes place. ln that sense, the 
First Amendnwnt cases seem at least somewhat inapposite. ~o speech 
has yet been regulated. Y ct the student-speech cases still suggest. 
where school authority begins and ends and, therefore, give an 
indication of hmv much cyberbullying lav,'s expand that authority by 
allowing schools to conduct surveillance of students well beyond the 
time and space of school. 
1:3!). See supra Parts LA, I.I3.2, and I.I3.:3. 
136. ld. 
137. For a discussion of how a school could dra('(. a eyberbullying policy that 
complies >vith First Amendment doctrine, sec Goodno, supra note 4. 
138. E.g., Tinker v. Des ;.Joines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(noting how student was suspended for wearing armband); Bethel Sc:h. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (noting how student was suspended 
for sexual innuendo-filled speech); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.. v. Kuhlmeicr, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988) (noting how student articles on pregnancy and 
divorce were excluded from school newspaper); .\lorse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. ;{g;{ (2007) (noting hmv student suspended for "Bong Hit.s 4 Jesus" 
banner at school assembly); \Visniev,rski v. Tid. of Educ., 494 F.:3d 34, 39 
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting how student. suspended for "creating and trans-
mitting drawing depicting shooting of teacher"); D(minger v. Niehoff, 
642 F.:)d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (not.ing how student excluded from election 
for protest against. rescheduling of ".lamfest" event); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting· how 
student. suspended for posting to a webpage ridiculing another student); 
S .. J.W. v Lee's Summit H-7 Sch. Dist.., 696 F.3d 771, 773 74 (8th Cir. 
2012) (noting how students suspended for "creating websit.e with blog 
containing variety of offensive, ra.cist, and sexist comments about school 
and classmates"). 
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B. The Limits of School A.uthm·ity Under Four·th Amendment Doctrine 
1. Schools' Authority to Search Students in School 
Schools' surveillance authorit~, under the majority of 
cybcrbullying statutes may seem something more akin to the 
authority to search students, 1vhich is subject. t.o the limits of the 
Fourth Amendment. \Vhile, as 1vith First Amendment doctrine, 
school snrvcillancc authority docs not fit neatly into current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, it is nonetheless instructive as to the general 
li1nits of school authority. Here too, the surveillance authority exceeds 
even the expanded search authority provided to schools under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The se1ninal case on schools' authority to conduct student 
searches is New Jersey v. T.LOY9 In T.L.O., a school assistant vice 
principal conducted au in-school search of a female student's purse ou 
the suspicion that she vms smoking in schooL thus violating school 
rulcs. 140 The search uncovered marijuana and related paraphernalia, 
and the girl subsequently faced delinquency eharges.ll1 She sought to 
suppress the evidence of the search on Fourth Anwndment grounds. 142 
Finding that the Fourth Amendment's "prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and sei:-mres applies to searches conducted b:y public school 
officials," the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the validity of the 
scarch. 1n The Court held that, unlike in other contexts, school 
officials need neither a \Varrant. nor probable cause to conduct. a 
search of students in school.H4 Rather, searches of students in school 
need only be reasonable , as determined through application of a. two-
factor analysis.w' First, a. court must ''consider 'whether 
the ... action was justified from its inccption."'14c; Second, a court. has 
to assess whether "the search a.s actually conducted 'was reasona.bl~r 
139. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The lower federal courts have heard 
Fourth Amendment cases in '\vhieh students challenged searches of their 
online activity. Vv'hen they have been presented with such cases, the 
courts analyze them under the T.L. 0. framework. E.g., R .. S. v. 
:\Jinnewaska Area Sch. Dist. 1\o. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Tviinn. 
2012) (assessing the search of a student's Facebook and e-rnail accounts 
after she in voluntarily gave school oJ'J'icials her login inl'ormat.ion under 
the T.L.O. standard and finding the search to have violated that 
standard). 
140. T.L. 0., 467 U.S. at :328. 
141. Id. at :)28-29. 
142. !d. (l.t :32!:1. 
143. ld. at :n:3. 
144. Id. at ;{40-41. 
14G. !d. a.t 341. 
146. ld. 
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related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
iu the first place. "' 117 Finding the search of T.L.O. to meet both 
prongs of the test, the Court concluded that it met constitutional 
strictures. 14~ 
Follovving T.L.O., the Supreme Court took up the question of 
whether schools could conduct suspicionless drug searches in 1/ernonia 
School D£sln:cr v. AdonY~' In Adon, the Court considered the claim 
of a student, .James Acton, who 1vauted to sign up to pla,y football 
but refused to consent to school-administered and school-required 
drug testing in order to do itY•H He challenged the drug-testing 
requirement on Fourth Amendment grouuds.~.-.1 The Court again 
applied a reasonableness standard, but it did not use the tvw-part test 
from T.L. 0. 1"~ It. upheld the drug testing program as reasonable 
because it found that (1) students have a reduced expectation of 
privacy in school and particularly in sports programs; (2) the requisite 
search was limited to drug testing (as opposed to also including things 
like pregnancy· testing): and (3) testing is needed due to the 
widespread school drug problem and related discipline problems. 13'1 
2. Tf Increased School Authority to Search Student Speech Ts a Guide, 
Cyberbullying Laws Expand School Authority 
Although they do not precisely cover surveillance under 
cybcrbullying laws, T.L. 0. and A don outline some of the limits on a 
school's search authority. !3oth limit school searches to those that are 
reasonable. The broad svvccp of schools' surveillance authority under 
cyberbullying statutes, though. largely defies this standard. Take the 
two-factor test set. forth in T.L. 0. for determining reasonableness; 154 
assuming school surveillance is a search, schools' surveillance of 
student online and electronic activity fails that two-factor test. First, 
the school authority fails the requirement that a search be "justified 
at its inception. "1"·; The broad surveillance authority provided by t.hc 
cyberbullying laws has no justification other than au undifferentiated 
understanding that. cyberbullying does happen sometimes among some 
students. This vague rationale for conducting surveillance of all 
147. ld. 
148. Id. at :Wi-47. 
149. Vernonia. Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Act.on, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). 
L50. ld. at 651. 
151. Id. 
152. Sec id. 11t 652. 
L53. ld. at 657 !58, 661. 
154. N.J. v. T.L.O., 4G9 C.S. 325, :::141 (1985). 
155. Id. 
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st.udent.s without. any specific suspicion aU.ached cannot. be considered 
legitimate justification. Second, the surveillance authority· under the 
cyberbullying lasvs cannot be deemed rea~:Jonably related in scope t o 
the initial justification. As already not.ed, t.hc surveillance authority 
can occur without. an:ything but. the most amorphous of justifications. 
In addition, the scope, \Vhich a.llmvs schools to monitor all students at 
all Limes, could not. be broader. To justify this scope, schools would 
have to suspect that all students are engaged in cyberbullying at all 
times. 1' 6 
Similarly, the cyberbullying laws arguably fail t.o sat.isfv t.he 
metric for reasonableness articulated in Acton. Acton requires that. in 
order for suspicionless, in-school student searches to be reasonable, 
they need t.o be limited in scope, among other things. Schools' 
surveillance of students under c:y·berbull,ying laws, however, can 
uncover vast amounts of information communicated online and 
electronically by students-not just information on cyberbullying. As 
such, the surveillance arguabl.Y defies the strictures of limitedness that. 
support a conclusion that a search is rea~:Jonable. 
That said, student. search doctrine both in T.L. 0. as well as in 
Acton still does not provide perfect. guidance for interpreting the 
li1nits of school surveillance authority for at least three reasons. First , 
T.L. 0. as w·cll a.<> A clan address searches that. happen in school. In 
T. L. 0., the suspected violation of school rules and the consequent. 
search conducted by the a~:Jsistant vice principal both happened in the 
school buildingY7 ln Acton, the search of James Acton would have 
occurred in school had he consented to it. "··~ The Supreme Court did 
not. then, and ha.<> not. subsequently, addressed vvhcther schools have 
any authority t.o search students outside the time and space of the 
physical school setting or any limits thereof. Because surveillance 
under cyberbullying laws happens outside school, whether and how 
the Fourth Amendment doctrine under T. L. 0. and Acton applies is 
an open question. 
Second, Fourth Amendment. doctrine on searches is invoked in 
order to suppress the evidence of the search \:vhen discipline (or 
prosecution) is imposed, or \Vhen other benefits or privileges are 
denied because of scarehes.1G!J The school surveillance of students' 
156. Sec id. at 34'1. For a discussion of hmv schools could have t.he authority 
to search students' electronic devices upon suspicion that eyberbullying 
was occurring in school during school hours, see Goodno, su.Jrr·n note 4. 
157. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
158. Vcrnoniu. Sch. Dist. 47.1 v. Acton, 015 U.S. 646, 650 ( 1995). 
L59. Students rnay be entitled to some redress for Fourth Amendment 
violations \vit.hout harm, but. t.he damages they can recover would likely 
be only nominal. Sec G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., Tl'l F.3d 62:3, 634 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
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online activity and the searches in T.L. 0. and Adon either resulted 
iu the discipline or t.he prosecution of a student, as in T. L. 0., or 1vere 
li1nited to when a student had volunteered for specific school 
acti vi tics, as in Adon_H>o Electronic surveillance under cybcrlmllying 
laws c:au happen without any consequent. discipline, prosecution, or 
denial of benefits or privileges. VVhether the Fourth Amendnwnt 
would provide redress for student. surveillance without actual 
discipline or denial of privileges, then, is also au open question.!(;! 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment doctrine under T.L. 0. and Acton 
docs not. provide precise bounds for t.hc limits of school surveillance of 
students' online and electronic: activity. H;z 
Third, in order for the Fourth Amendnwnt to be implicated, 
students must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. 
of the search. 16.1 \Vhet.her students have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in many online and electronic communications is at be~:Jt 
questionablcY>4 Frequently used online t.ools and services like Googlc 
make clear that. users' expectation of privacy in their searches and 
po~:Jts i~:J li1nited.165 
Despite these limitations on T.L.O. and Arion as guidelines for 
the confines of school surveillance authority, they nonetheless 
demonstrate, more generally, some of the boundi:l on school authority. 
Like student-speech cases, t.hey offer insight int.o t.hc outer limits of 
the authorit.Y of schools t.o search student. iu school and impose 
consequences as a result. .!\ ot\:vithstanding that school ~:Jurveillance 
under cyberbull:ying laws occurs outside school (as well as inside) and 
potentially without the consequences of prosecution or the denial of 
privileges, it exceeds the kinds of limits set by the Fourth 
Amendment. lt allows for the unjustified collection of potentially vast 
a.rnounti:l of information communicated by ~:Jtudent~:J electronically at 
160. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329; \lerrwrda Sch. lHst. 47.1, 515 L·.s. at 650. 
161. See Clapper v. Amnesty Tnt'l CSA, 13:~ S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (railing 
to reach the issue or whether surveilla.nee alone would be actionable 
under the Fourth Amendment. as the plaintiff~ could not point t.o a 
~ubstantiated instance of government surveillance). 
162. See T.L.O., 469 C.S. at 329 (determining whether the search in question 
was unreasonable for the purpose of suppressing uncovered evidence in 
the subsequent delinquency charges). 
163. ld. at ;);)7, 
164. Thanks to l\Iare V\Feber, Founder and Curator of t.he Internet History 
Prognun at the Computer History lVIuscum, for bringing this salient 
point to the Author's ;1ttention. 
165. Conor Dougherty, Googl~: Gives Child PoTTwgraphy £vidence to Police, 
The Bus. of Tech. Blog, ~.Y. TnviJ:<:.S (Aug. 4, 2014, 9:41 Prvi), hUp:j I 
bits. blogs. nyti mes.com 12014108104 I googlc-g·ives-c:h ild-pornography-
cmail-evidence-to-polic:el?_php=truc&_type=blogs&_r=O. 
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the Government 1vill choose t.o invoke its authority under 
§ 1881 a rather than utili"'ing another method of surveillance: (3) 
the Article TIT judges \Vho serve on the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court. will conclude that the Government's 
proposed surveillance procedures [will] satisfy §1881a's many 
safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment: ( 4) 
the Government. vvill succeed m intercepting the 
cornmunicationl'i of [plaintiffs'] contacts; and (5) respondents will 
be partiel'i t.o the particular communications that the 
G overnrnent. intercept.l'i. 171 
Taking isl'ille with the conject ural nature of the plaintiffs' asl'iertions 
of injury in Clapper·, the Court identified factors that \Vonld have, if 
satisfied, arguably make the injuries real and present. Had the 
plaintiffs' contacts been government targets, and the government 
then conducted surveillance on them 1vith the blessing of the FISA 
Court, the plaintiffs would have had greater success establishing their 
injuryY·· Had they also been able to show that the surveillance of 
their contacts >vas successful and occurred \vhile the plaintiffs \vere 
parties to those communications, then the pla.intiffs likely would have 
succeeded in showing an injury that satisfied Article ITT standing 
requirements. 176 
How the Cyberbullying Laws Exceed or I\early Exceed Limits on 
Government Surveillance Authorit:v 
\Vhile not a school surveillance case, Clapper offers some possible 
insight regarding li1nits on state and, therefore, school surveillance 
authority more generally. The fact that. school surveillance authority 
under the cyberbullying statutes, in at least some states, could meet 
the requirements for showing an injury under Clapper is suggestive of 
the breadth of schools' authority . In Clapper, the Comt first took 
issue 1vith the fact that the plaintiffs may not have been subjected t o 
surveillance at all, making their claims of injury speculative. 177 C nlike 
the plaint.iiis in Clapper, however, students arc quite clearly the 
targets of surveillance in states where schools have unlimited or nearly 
unlimited authorit~r to monitor their online and electronic activit~r . 
'Moreover, the students arc in fact being monitored through the usc of 
comprehensive monitoring s:y·stems offered by companies like G eo 
Listening and CompuGuardian. 
174. Id. 
175. Sec id. (finding no injury due in part t.o the plaintiffs' inability t o 
~ubstantiate their argument that they themselve~ \vere the target of any 
aetual government ~urveillance). 
176. See id. 
177. !d. 
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Similarly, unlike the plaintifis in Clapper, students in those 
schools and school districts have an argument that the surveillance 
authority granted under the cyberbullying la1vs fails to satisfy existing 
safeguards under the Fourth Amendment for the reasons articulated 
in Part 11.13.2 of this Article. As already discussed, whether students 
would succeed in this argument is still an open question: hovvever. 
that the argument even exists demonstrates the breadth of school 
surveillance authority. 
Finally, students in schools and school districts using the services 
and products of companies like Gco Listening and CompuGuardian 
could show that surveillance is effectively used to intercept their 
particular com1nunication. The cmnpanies that provide services and 
produc1.s to allow schools to conduct surveillance boast of their 
effectiveness at intercepting students' online and electronic 
infonnation, indicating their success at the interception of the 
communicationsY' In smn, the surveillance authority under 
cyberbullying statutes in these schools and school districts pushes the 
boundaries of even the federal government's li1nits on surveillance 
authority as it arguably comes close to creating an injury or injuries-
especiall:y to the extent that students change their behavior or incur 
costs to avoid monitoring. 
Students attending schools and school districts that have yet to 
use all the authorit:y provided under the c,yberbullying laws t o 
conduct comprehensive monitoring would be less able to meet the 
elements set forth in Clapper. l3ut the schools need only decide to pa.y 
1noney to a company like Geo Listening or CompuGuardian, and 
students would likely be able to overcome the problems that stymied 
the plaintiffs in Clapper. Thus, even in those schools and school 
districts, the surveillance authority under the cyberbullying statutes 
nearly exceeds general limits on government surveillance. 
Although no doctrinal limits exist for school surveillance authority 
under cyberbullying la1vs, First and Fourth Amendment st.udent-
speech and search doctrines a..c; well a..c; the doctrine on general 
government. surveillance provides a general outline for when and 
where students are subject to school authority and the extent of that 
authority. By allowing schools in most states to conduct surveillance 
of students whenever and 1vherever the:r are, cyberbull:ying laws nm 
roughshod over t.hese kinds of doctrinal limits failing to take them as 
any kind of guide regarding how far school surveillance authority can 
legitimately· reach. These statutes create a world where everywhere is 
"in school" and therefore vastly expand the reach of school authority. 
If that were all the cybcrbullying laws did, the expansion of school 
178. ·wallace, supra. note Hi (quoting the President o[ Safe Outlook 
Corporation as proclaiming the amount of information his product can 
collect that can help schools discipline students for online behavior). 
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1. Intellectual Privacy 
Professor Neil Richards has articulated the concept of intellectual 
privacy.~'" In essence, t.hc theory of int.dlect.ual privacy is about t.he 
ability to develop ideas on one's mvn. 1 ~1; \Vhile Ridw.rds conceives of 
intellectual privacy as "'a series of nested protections," the core is 
about. t.he ability t.o consider, weigh, and think through one's mNn 
beliefs and thoughts. 1' 7 ~.\lore specificall:y, Richards defines intellectual 
pnvacy as "the ability, whether protected by lavv or social 
circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the umNanted 
ga~e or interference of others." 1 '~ 
Richards conceives of intellectual privacy as having four 
demcnts. m1 The first and "core" dement. of intellectual privacy "is t.he 
freedom of thought and belief. '' 1!10 lt covers all the thoughts and beliefs 
a.n individual has. 19 1 Spatial privacy is the second elenwnt, and it 
"refers t.o t.he protection of places-physical, social, or otherwise-
against intrusion or surveillance." l!l~ It is an integral component to 
intellectual pnvacy because people need these spaces free of 
interference in order to develop their thoughts and beliefs. 19;' The third 
elernent of intellectual privac:y,. is the freedon1 of intellectual 
exploration. 194 This right protects the ability to develop ne\v ideas and 
all t.he processes involved in doing so. 1!1-, Finally, t.he fourth dement. of 
intellectual privac,y is confidential comnnmications. 1!)(i As Richards 
explains, " [ c] onfidentiality protects the relationships in vvhich 
information is shared, allowing candid discussion a way from the 
prying ears of others.''l \JT It protects information frmn disclosure to or 
by third parties. E'8 
185. See Richards, supra note 19; Richards, supra note 183. 
186. Richards, supra note 18:3, at :389. 
187. ld. at 408. 
188. !d. f).( 389. 
189. Id. at :392. 
190. id. at 408. 
191. Id. 
192. !d. a.t 412. 
193. ld. at 41:3. 
194. Id. at 4Hi. 
195. !d. 
196. id. at 421. 
197. Id. 
198. !d. a.t 422. 
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\Vhcn schools have the authority t.o conduct surveillance of 
students, the intellectual privacy of students is squarel.Y impacted. 
Each elenwnt of intellectual privacy is affected. Students' freedom of 
thought. and belief is infringed because c_vbcrbullying laws give schools 
access to almost any thoughts and beliefs students express 
electronically, regardless of whether they have anything to do with 
c_vbcrbullying. If a student. expresses a private thought. about. the 
quality of a school research assignment electronicall:y, the school 
would potentially have access to those thoughts. If a. student 
expresses frustration with her parents' imposition of a curfew online, 
the school would potentially have access to that information as well. 
Schools also ha.ve access to the electronic spaces in which students 
express themselves under the cybcrbullying laws, and thus they 
encroach on their students' spatial privac:y. The companies that 
collect students' online data go to these spaces sometimes public and 
sometimes privat.c-t.o obtain t.hc data. They even look to the spaces 
of the students' ke,ystrokes when collecting students' electronic 
infonna.tion.H>•J 
To the extent st.udcnt.s usc those spaces t.o develop ideas, t.hc 
school can invade students' freedom of intellectual exploration. 
Consider the student \Vho questions a teacher's interpretation of a 
particular piece of lit.crat.urc. If a student. expresses that. idea online, 
the school would have access to it. Surely not all students are using 
their time online to express high-1ninded thoughts, but even less 
academic expressions of thought fall under the category of intellectual 
explorat.ion. Even social communication about diques and rmnantic 
alliances falls into the category of intellectual exploration for a 
teenager who is learning to navigate an increasingly complex social 
systen1 as she matures. Thus, for students in the majority of states, 
the cybcrbullying laws allow their schools to intrude upon t.his 
intellectual exploration. 
\Vhen any electronic or online communicat.ion is made a.t least in 
twenty-five or arguably t.hirt.y-two st.atcs-t.he confidentiality of the 
communication is gone. lf a student cmmmmica.tes electronically to a 
friend, 1na.kes a comment on a blog, or posts on social media, most 
schools would have the authority to access these communications. 
Thus, the students' abilities to cornrnunicate confidentially online is 
significantly reduced. 'While it. is true that. this reduct.ion in 
confidentiality could be somewhat count.cract.cd if students tightened 
privacy settings on social media. sites and applications. this solution is 
only partial at best. Students \vould have to be conscientious enough 
to monitor their privacy settings often so when the privacy policies of 
199. \Valla.cc, .mpra note 16. 
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the companies offering the applications and social media change, the 
students could reassess the scope of their privac::y settings2110 
As a result of the~:Je invasions, ~:Jtudenti:l' intellectual privacy i~:J 
curtailed as a whole when exercised electronically. Given t.hat D5 
percent of teens are online, the numlwr of students potentially 
affected by this curtailment can reasonably be called significant .·20 1 
Surveillance of their intellectual act.i vit.ies and the invasion of their 
intellectual privacy runs counter to even their relatively limited in-
school Fir~:Jt Amendment freedomi:l. Al~:Jo, as will be discussed in Part 
III.B, the potential these invasions have for undermining the 
c:reativit.Y of students' thoughts and intellectual pursuits nms contrary 
to the purpose of school. 
2. Quantitative Privacy 
Professors Danielle Keats Citron and David Gra,y have expounded 
the concept of quantitative privacy, \Vhich focu~:Jei:l on hmv, hmv much, 
and how frequently surveillance and data collection occur.~02 They 
argue that '>Vhat is troubling about data collection is how broad and 
indiscriminate it is. ~0 '1 Such collection, they posit, "intrudes upon 
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy by raising t.he specter 
of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is left 
to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement or other govermnent 
agents. ''~04 In the context. of the Fourth Amendment, Citron and Gray 
contend that if quantitative privacy rights are implicated, the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard must. come t.o bear on the 
search. ~or, 
Cyberbullying lav,·s impinge on quant.it.ative privacy.~06 They allmv 
for t.he broad, indiscriminate collection of data by the st.at.e because 
they allow for schools to collect virtually any online or electronic: data 
of any ~:Jtudent. in the mune of ferrett.ing out cyberbullying.207 Because 
the school is no less an arm of t.he stat.e than law enforcement., school 
200. Facebook, l'or example, is no(,orious Cor regularly changing i(,s priva.c:y 
policies without ample and obvious disclosure to users. Sec, e.g., Brian 
Fung, Your Faccbook Privacy Settings Arc About to Chang e. Again. 
\VASIL POsT, Apr. 8, 2014, available a.t http: / / w>v\v.>vashingtonpost. 
com/blogs/ the-switch/ wp /2014/ 04/ 08/ your-face book-privacy-set. t.ings-
are-a bout-to-change-again/ . 
201. :vra.ddcn ct a.l., 8upra note 72. 
202. Gray & Citron, 8'11Jim note 184. 
20:). Id. at 73-82. 
204. !d. <1t 72. 
205. ld. 
206. See supra Pari I.B.2, Part I.E.:{. 
207. !d. 
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no(. gel. cxprcssccl."v; Surveillance makes people "cxtrcmelv 
uncomfortable. "~EJ Simply put, innovative ideas or ideas that may be 
perceived a.s controversial are harder to express in an atnwsphere of 
discomfort. ~~0 
lt is for this reason, among others, that Richards calls for the 
protection of intellectual privacy. Richards argues that without its 
protection, individuals cannot develop 1.hc ideas and beliefs necessary 
to exercise their First Amendment rights.221 Freedom of speech lacks 
1neaning if individuals cannot engage in the processes necessary or 
have the space necessary to develop their own thoughts and ideas to 
then exercise their First Amendment rights.~22 \Vhether ne1v or extant, 
if ideas cannot be developed or expressed, as Richards notes, the First 
Amendment protections lose substantial significance.~"'' Freedom of 
speech and expression mean little when individuals cannot develop 
the ideas in the first place or fear sharing them 1vith others. 
\Vhcn schools can conduct broad surveillance of students, 
students face these civil liberties harms. The only difference between 
students facing these hanns and individuals in the public facing them 
more generally is that for students the harms arc more acute because 
the school holds the authority. The harms are more acute because 
they stand in direct opposition to the purpose of school. Schools ' 
function is to educate "the young for citizenship. "~~4 This means 1.ha!. 
schools serve to "[inculcate] 'fundamental values necessary to the 
1naintenance of the denwcratic political system. "'225 Indeed. 
educational philosopher and reformer John Dewey considered 
education to be an integral part of the right. to vot.e. 226 
Y ct. when schools have the authority 1.o conduct broad, 
comprehensive surveillance of students, students suffer civil liberties 
harms and fail to learn the values necessary for participation in 
democracy. Surveillance can have a chilling effect on their willingness 
to articulate ideas, particularly because students are increasingly 
using electronic means to communicate their ideas and thoughts as 
218. !d. f).( 1949. 
219. Solovc, supra note 19, at 49;). 
220. ld. 
221. Richards, supra note 183, at 389. 
222. Richards, .mpra. note 19, at 1946-47. 
223. Richards, 8'11Jim note 18:3, at :389. 
224. Tinker v. Des 1\'loines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.. 393 U.S. 50:{, 507 (19G9). 
225. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 406 v. Frnscr, 478 U.S. 670, 681 (1986) (quoting 
Ambach v. I\orwick, 441 C.S. 68, 76 77 (1979)). 
226. Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Posl-Parenls Involved 
Challenqe: Confrontinq F:xtraleqal Obstaclc8 to Jnteqration, 69 OHTo S'T'. 
L..J. 1015, 10:34 (2008). 
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compared wit.h in-pcrson or phone communication.~"' If their ability t.o 
develop new ideas is compromised, they cannot. reasonably learn how 
to become engaged members of a democracy, where ideas are the 
bedrock of discourse and t.he informed vot.e.1~s School authority t.o 
conduct. broad, comprehensive surveillance, then, suppresses rather 
than imbues the values of citizenship and democracy in students. 
Of conrsc, one purpose of any cyberbullying law and any 
attendant. surveillance authorit,y is to prevent students from engaging 
in cyberbullying by not only rooting it out but also preventing it 
quelling the speech before it. happens. Y ct., broad surveillance of 
students has the potential to do much more than quiet. cyberlmll,ying. 
It can stifle a much broader array of speech, teaching students to not 
participate in t.he intellectual exchanges that form the basis for 
democratic: participation. 
2. Imbalance in the State-Citizen Pmver Relationship 
Another harm of surveillance is a change in t.he "power dynamic 
between the '>Vat.cher and the watched" with the increase in power 
going to the \Vatcher .n:J .!\ eil Richards as well as Professor Daniel 
Solovc both c!Tectivcly contend t.hat t.his change in the power dynamic 
between the state and citizens can result. in harms such as 
discrimination and blackmail. no Surveillance is a tool of pmver .·231 
227. A 2012 Pew Hesearch study found that 63 percent of teens communicate 
by text messa.ge daily while only 39 percent and :~5 percent 
communicate over cell phones or in person, respectively. Amanda 
Lcnhmt., Tr:Ttinq Dominates Trr:ns' Gcncm.l Commun·ira.tion Choices, PEW 
RESEARCH li\TERNET PROJECT (.\1ar. 19, 2012), http:/ /www.pew 
internet.org/2012/03/19/cornrnunication-choicesj. Although it can be 
argued that applications such as Snapchat, which create ephemeral 
messages that. disappear after being read, reduce or eliminate any 
chilling effect, that argument fails to consider that. even Snapchat 
messages can be saved by either the sender or the receiver. Snapchat 
Guide for T'arenis, snpra note 43, a(. G. 
228. \Vhile it. may be that. much of students' online and electronic 
communications have much less to do with high-minded democratic 
debate and more to do with clothes, student romance, and the like, that 
does not mean that students do not engage in debates that are 
meaningful and loster their participation in the democracy. For 
example, in Doninqer v. Niehoff, the student in question engaged in a 
debate online about a school official's decision to rnove the date or 
location of a student event. Though perhaps done in an inappropriate 
\vay, the debate about whether this could be done was ultimately one 
about school authority and student right~. Dcmingcr v. Niehotf, 642 F.3d 
334, :3:39-41 (2d Cir. 2011). 
229. Richards, 8'11J!f'fl note 19, at Hl53. 
2:m. Id. at 1935; Solove, supra note 19, at 540-41. 
231. Richards, .mpra note 19, at 1952-53; Solove, sv.pra note 19, at 49:3. 
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\Vhcn the povver is increased such that the watcher has the tools to 
categori~e people, the power can ''bleed imperceptibly into the power 
of discriinination. "232 \Vhile not all discrimination is bad, surveillance 
allows the unfet.tcred ability to classify people by type, which can lead 
to umvanted or unlawful discrimination. 
This change in the power dynamic also can lead to blackmail.23:l 
The sheer amount of data that can potentially be collected through 
surveillance can lead to the revelation of individuals' secrets.~·~~ This 
infonnation can easily be used against vvatched individuals for the 
gain of the watcher.~:>s 
ln the school setting where the school is the '>Vatcher and the 
students are the vvatched, these harms are intensified for at least tv,'o 
reasons. First, schools already hold a larger proportion of power over 
students than does the state generally in the state-citihen 
relationship.n6 Schools have increased authority to infringe on 
students' First Amendment rights as well as their Fourth Amendment. 
rights, and they have limited liabilit:y when they do cause students 
ha.nn.n7 Coupling this already-extant power i1nbalance \Vith the 
amount of information that schools can obtain on students via 
surveillance authority under the cyberbullying laws only intensifies 
the power imbalance. 
Second, schools have a recurring history of engaging in 
discrimination, and students are particularly vulnerable to its harms. 
The ongoing series of school segregation cases attest that schools are 
not strangers to discrimination.n~ As burgeoning members of the 
adult social and economic spheres, students depend on schools to help 
them enter and na vigatc those worlds. Discrimination or blackmail 
can hamper or even destro:y students' abilities to reach their potential 
in these arenas. This result could happen in myriad \vays. Schools 
could discriminate against students based on surveillance in large or 
small forms , such as by determining \vho gets into honors classes 
based on surveillance data, thus potentially affect.ing students' college 
232. Richards, supra. note 19, ac 1957. 
2:3:3. Id. at 19;'i:3. 
234. ld. 
2:{5. Id. (citing, by example, the use of information gained from FBI wiretaps 
of Dr. :.\Iartin Luther King Jr. to later blackmail him). 
236. S·upra Parts ll.A, ll.B. 
2:H. Id.; see also infra note 238 and accompanying texL 
238. The mo~t famous of these C<J.sc~ involved rnci<!.l scgreg·ation and occurred 
decades ago. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., :347 U.S. 48:3 (19;)4); Swann v . 
Charlotte-_'deeklenburg Bd. of Edue., 402 l; .s. 1 (1971); Milliken v . 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). How·ever, desegregation cases continue 
toda.y. R.g., Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Dd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
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admissions. Similarly, surveillance information could be used to 
blackmail students by incorporating it into a threat to withhold 
school services. Failure to receive school services, such as effective 
guidance services, could lead to problems getting jobs or int.o college 
after graduation. Of course, to be fair, the schools do have to control 
student behavior as reflected in any school discipline code. However, 
the maintenance of discipline in school is distinct. from t.hc usc of va.<>l. 
amounts of data to control students' behavior, especiall.Y through 
1neans such as discrimination or blackmail. 
:3. Incorrect. Dat.a 
Finally, surveillance can cause harms ·when the data collected are 
incorrect or incorrectly interpreted. Professors Citron and Gray point 
out. examples of the problems that result from incorrect. or incorrectly 
interpreted data.n!l These harms include emplo,yers' not hiring 
individuals based on erroneous data and the incorrect identification of 
individuals as pot.cnt.ial terrorists or security thrcats.~40 
ln schooL the problem of incorrect or incorrect.l.Y interpreted data 
is as challeng·ing or more so. As previously noted, the authority 
schools have over st.udcnt.s' li vcs and futures is significant.. H includes, 
on the low end of the spectrum, control over which activities, classes, 
and electives students participate in. These all may have an impact 
on students' futures since college admissions offices consider all of 
those factors in their decision making. This problem also spans t o 
more direct control over students' ability t.o get int.o college or find 
work after high school because they· need recormnendations and 
assistance from school staff to be considered for a dmission or 
employment. To t.he extent. t.hat school stall arc insufficiently helpful 
in these endeavors because of incorrect or incorrectl:y interpreted data 
gained from school surveillance of student online and electronic 
activity (as opposed to out of a desire to discriminate or blackmail 
students), the impact can be large and long lasting. 
The harms derived from incorrect. or incorrectly interpreted data 
a.<> vvell as t.he civil liberties harms and harms from the incrca.<>cd 
imbalance in the state-citizen or school-student power dynamic are 
also exacerbated by the fact that students cannot avoid them. 
Students arc required to al.t.end school because every st.at.e has a 
mandatory attendance law.211 Therefore, 1vhen a state has the 
authority to conduct broad surveillance of students, escaping the 
surveillance and its harms is nearly impossible. 
ln addition, 1:vhen these harms occur. schools have alrnost no 
liability. As already noted earlier, no cyberbullying statute has a 
239. Gray & Citron, 8'11Jim note 184, at 80 81. 
240. Id. 
241. Sec supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
47
  
CASE \VESTER.\ RESERVE LAw REvmw · VOJ.u,m 65 · IssL·E 1 · 2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates 
cause of action. Indeed, fourteen slates' cyberbullying laws expressly 
provide schools 1vith immunity from liability under c:y·berbull,ying laws 
or deny any cause of action under them. 242 ~orth Dakota's bullying 
legislation, for example, states that it. docs "not create or alter any 
civil cause of action. "2u Similarly, schools have very limited tort 
lia.bility.2+4 \Vhile schools have been held responsible for causing 
physical harm t.o students, these have only been in extreme cases.~4" 
The federal appellate courts have not held schools responsible for the 
i1nposition of severe emotional harm on students?16 As a result , 
students who suffer privacy harms related to school surveillance have 
little to no recourse. 
IV. l\IOVI='i'G FORWARD: LIIVIITING SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE 
AL;THOH.ITY AND PROTECTING STum;:-ns 
FROM PRIVACY HARl'viS 
The cyberbull:ying laws, for all t.he good intentions that underlie 
their passage, have not only vastly expanded school authority but 
have also created a new set of problems for students in the form of 
privacy hanns.2 17 Aceordingl:y, 1vhile t.he:y· are a 1vell-meaning start. to 
addressing the challenging, painful problem of cyberbullying, the laws 
need to be changed in two ways t.o limit. school surveillance authority 
and any attendant privacy harms. This Part proposes these t.wo 
242. ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.230 (2012); ARK. CODE Al\'N. § 6-18-514(g) 
(20B): D~:L. Com; AJ\N. tit.. 14, § 4l12D(e) (2011); FLA. S'I'A'I'. 
§ 1006.147(6) (We~t 2011); GA. CoDE A:'-11\·. § 20-2-7D1.4(e) (2012); 
ImvA CoDE § 280.28(5) (2011); :\ID. CoDE A:'-11\-., Em1c. § 7-424(4) 
(2012); J'vlASS. GE:-1. LAWS ch. 71, § 370(i) (\Vest 2013); NEV. H.EV. 
STAT.§ 388.'137 (Lexisl\"exis 2013); ~.H. R~:v. STAT. Al\N. §§ 193-F:7, 
F:9 (2011); 1\".D. C~;:'•l'l'. Com:§ 15.1-19-2193 (2013); OHIO R~<;v. Com; 
AN:'-1. § :3:31:3.667(c) (Lcxi~Ncxis 2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ :3:39.:362(:3), 
339.364 (\Vest 2011); TEN :-I. CODE A:-~1\·. § 49-6-4505( c) (2013). 
243. 1'\.D. c~:NT. Com;§ 15.1-19-22 (2013). 
244. Immunity from tort liability still exist~ in a number of states. See Tviark 
C. \Vcbcr, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 4:3 \VM. & 
J'vli\RY L. H.EV. 1079, 1145 (2002). 
245. See id.; see generally Emily F. Suski, Dark Sarcasm in lhe Classroom: 
The Failure of the Court8 to Recognize Students' Severe Rmotional 
Harm as Unconstitutional, 62 CLF-V. S1'. L. REV. 125 (2014) (analyt~ing 
why students' substantive due process dairns have only sueceeded in the 
federal courts of appeals in cases o[ extreme physical pain, such as when 
s\..Udents have been hit by school of11dals, but not emotional harm, such 
a;; when school official;; have caused post-trn.umatic stress disorder <J.nd 
suicidal idPA'1tion). 
246. See Suski, supra note 245, at 128 ("1\"o federal court. of appeals, however, 
has found a student's severe emoUonal harm alone unconstitutional."). 
247. Sec supra Part TTl. 
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changes. Specifically, it calls for a framework for limiting schools' 
surveillance authority and for the addition of a cause of action to the 
la\vs so students 1nay seek recourse vvhen schools exceed that 
authority. A framework for determining the boundaries of school 
surveillance authorit:y is necessar:y because while schools do need some 
authority to monitor students' online activity beyond the school 
setting, they do not need a.<> much authority as they currently have, 
particularl.Y because of the imposed privac,y harms.2 1~ The:r need the 
ability to intervene outside the physical school building in some 
instances because they arc the natural arbiters of disputes between 
students when those problems impact school. \Vhen and hmv far 
beyond the school setting and into places like a student's bedroom 
that school authority should reach, though, is another matter. A 
meaningful framework can set the limits for this authority. 
A cause of action in the cyberbullying laws is also necessary 
because students need a mechanism to enforce any such limits on 
schools' surveillance authorit,y. As just discussed, the c,yberbullying 
la\vs do not provide students \Vith any means for recourse when the 
schools exceed what limits may exist on their surveillance authority 
and impose privac,y harms. This change also will help limit school 
authority and the attendant privacy harms created b~r the 
cybcrbullying laws by providing a means for controlling school 
authority and redressing privacy harms. 
A. Lim:iting 8chool8' Surve·illanu· Authority: 
The Ncrus Standurd ll'ork:s and R7~,y It vVor-k:s 
Lirniting the broad expansion of school authority under the 
cybcrbullying statutes and the attendant privacy harms requires a 
frame\:vork for determining the outer limits of school authority beyond 
the physical school setting. Part II explains hmv cyberbullying lavvs 
expand school authority. That only takes the matter so far, though. It. 
explains vvh:y the c:yberbull:ying laws now are too broad but does not 
provide a. framework for evaluating hmv far school surveillance 
authority should be allowed to go beyond the physical setting of the 
school. 
The nexus framework articulated by the Fourth Circuit in 
Kmoo.lski v. Berkeley Cov.nly Schools, while developed in the context 
of a First Amendment anal:ysis, provides a useful starting point for 
evaluating hmv far school surveillance authority should extend more 
248. School~ n.lrcady do n. fair amount of surveillance on students while they 
are in school in way~ other than by monitoring their online and 
electronic activity, such a~ "having law enforcement prPBent on campus, 
controlling access Lo school grounds by locking or monitoring gaLes, and 
insta.lling security cameras." Jason P. 1\ance, School Surveillance and 
the Fonrth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 82 (2014). 
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generally .149 In K owalksi, t.hc Court. required a sufficient. nexus 
between the school's pedagogical interests and the student's actions to 
justify the dii:Jcipline.r.o This nexus standard provides a helpful 
framework for t.hc evaluation of school surveillance authority for at. 
least two reasons. First, it necessarily limits the school authorit:y to 
instances in which the school has a substantial interest in and 
relationship t.o a student's actions as they occur. Second, some of the 
cyberbullying statutes already require a substantial nexus to school 
before triggering the school authority to 1nonitor or discipline 
st.udent.s' online or electronic act.ivit.y.~-,1 They therefore offer at. least. a 
partial wa,y forward for the rest-the bulk-of cyberbullying la ... vs: 
providing an applicable fnunework that can serve the purpose of 
curbing cyberbullying while keeping school authority within 
reasonable limits and protecting students' from school-imposed 
privacy harms. 
To accomplish this, the nexus requirement. must be specifically 
and explicitly tied to the authority to conduct surveillance of 
students, as distinct from a school's ability to discipline a student for 
cybcrbullying when it happens. I\Iorc precisely, a school's ability to 
conduct surveillance should be tied to location and subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. \Vhile in 
Kowalsb: the Court. declined to address the "metaphysical question'' 
of where Internet conduct occurs, the question nonetheless must be 
addressed in order to adequately determine the breadth and limits of 
school surveillance authority. 2''~ 
Indeed, the metaphysical question of where school boundaries 
start and end in t.he context of school surveillance authority is not. 
that thoru:y when it is tied to location, and more specificall:y the 
location of students >vho either send or receive cyberbullying 
messages. Consider, for example, an alternative: using time as t.hc 
metric for determining the boundaries of school surveillance authority. 
That nexus might link school authority to times when students are 
doing school-related activities. Hovvcver, students could be engaged in 
school-related activity at any time. They could arguably be engaged 
in school-related activities at home >vhile doing homework in their 
bedrooms. If school surveillance authority were so limited under t.hc 
eyberbullying statutes. it would either amount to a complete limit or 
not much of a. limit. at all. Not knmving \Vhen students engage in 
school-related activities could leave schools in a position where they 
never monitor students' online activity unless students are in school 
249. Kown.bki v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.:3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
2,50. ld. at 573. 
251. See supra Part. I.B.l. 
252. Kowalski, 652 F.3d a.t 07:3. 
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because !.hal. is the only time they arc surely engaged in school or 
school-related activities. Alternatively, it could also provide schools 
with the argument that they can conduct surveillance at almost any 
time since they have no way to know when students were engaged in 
online or electronic school-related activity. Thus, time offers an 
unworkable metric. 
Location of the students provides a bc1.1.cr, simpler limit on school 
surveillance authority. lf surveillance power is tied to student 
location, then a meaningful limit is imposed on that authority. To 
llcsh this nexus out further and more explicitly, the cybcrbullying 
laws should only allow schools to conduct surveillance of students' 
online and electronic activit~r if students are at school or a school-
sponsored activity . The la1Jcr should be defined broadly to include 
when students are ou school vehicles, at school bus stops, or at 
school-sponsored events. The question that then arises is how schools 
would know whether students arc at school or school-sponsored 
events. The old-fashioned methods of taking attendance would suffice 
for many, if not most, activities. Hovvever, it would not suffice for all. 
Football games, for example, arc school-sponsored activities thai. 
typically do not involve attendance-taking. Yet even at these kinds of 
events, schools have at their disposal metal detectors, cameras, and 
other means of knowing which students arc or arc not a1. 1.hc events.~";' 
\Vhile one could very reasonably quibble with whether this level of 
essentially on-ca1npus surveillance should occur, it does occur and 
courts have upheld schools' use of these methods.~"1 Thus schools can 
use this technology to knmv vvhether st.udents are at such school-
sponsored events. 
This location nexus works to allow schools to gather information 
in the name of determining whether cyberbullying might be occurring, 
but i1. still limits i1.. Location-nexus restriction still allows for broad 
data collection, but it does not allow it 1vherever and whenever the 
data might be generated or received. Schools have a much better 
argument for broad data collection when students arc at school or 
school-sponsored activities because they have that interest in learning 
of any threat t.o the "order, safety, and 1vell-being of students"253 \Vhen 
they arc in locations that render them essentially in school cus1.ody.~" 1; 
Location makes sense too in that the rela.tiouship between school 
surveillance authority and space defines \Vhat. it. means to be in 
school. or course, the fact !.hal. this nexus is the nexus used by twelve 
253. Nu.ncc, snpra. not.c 248, u.t 96. 
2,54. ld. 
255. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at. 573. 
256. Na.nce, supra. note 248, a.t 1:3:3 (describing the responsibilities schools 
ha.ve for students' well-being and safety). 
51 
  
CASE \VESTER.\ RESERVE LAw REvmw · VOJ.u,m 65 · IssL·E 1 · 2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates 
slates serves t.o show that it docs not. so limit. school authorilv t.o a 
place outside the mainstream. 
Surveillance of students at school or at school-sponsored activities 
will still potentially be broad in t.hat it can in vol vc more than a few 
students: therefore, the surveillance needs to be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard. As for the Fourth Anwndnwnt 
reasonableness standard, as articulated in Part. II, t.hc cybcrbullying 
laws arguably breach this standard to begin with. Wh,y, then, is this 
standard not sufficient? First, it requires students to know \Vhen they 
arc being monitored. For many students, they may not knovv. The 
authority, though being used for comprehensive monitoring in some 
places, is still inchoate in many others. Thus, the search may or may 
not occur. The privacy harms occur because of the potential for t.hc 
search, but the search itself need never occur for the harm to be 
rendered. Thus, the reasonableness standard alone does not fully 
protect students or limit. school authority to conduct smvcillancc of 
them. 
If a. schooL for example, has no cause to think cyberbullying may 
be happening in school or among students, then schools st.ill should 
not be conducting surveillance of students. lt would not meet the 
"justified at its inception" test required of student searches under 
T.L. 0.1'" And even if a school docs have cause to believe 
cyberbullying is happening, the school should still limit the scope of 
surveillance to a.s fe\v students a.s possible in order to meet the scope 
requirement of T. L. 0. 2··,,; 
Lirniting schools' access to their online and electronic activity in 
these ways will protect students from privacy harms. These limits will 
provide students with space free of the watchful e:re of the schools to 
express themselves online and electronically and thereby decrease civil 
liberties harms. Also, these limits vvill help to provide more balance in 
the power relationship between the state, in the form of schools, and 
the citizen-students by limiting state authority over students. 
Additionally, by limiting t.hc information the schools have, these 
limits address concerns about incorrect or incorrectly interpreted 
data. 
These limits on school surveillance authority also mean that. tha t. 
school may not catch some, even a lot, of c:yberbullying through 
surveillance of students' online and electronic activity. To the extent 
that. cybcrbullying messages arc being sent and received when 
students are not in school or at school-sponsored activities, schools 
could not catch it. through surveillance. This is not. to suggest., 
though, that. cybcrbullying occurring outside school or school-
sponsored activities should not be caught or addressed. It does mean, 
257. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 C'S 325, 341 (1985); see supra Part II.B. 
258. T. [. 0., 469 U.S. at 341. 
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however, t.hat it. would not be revealed by means of school 
surveillance.~'·!' Schools cannot be responsible for rooting out and 
addressing all cyberbullying \Vhenever and vvherever it happens. 
Parents and the rest. of socicl.y have a responsibility t.o identify and 
address cyberbull:ying as well. 
It should also be noted that this nexus framevvork is distinct from 
any nexus t.o t.hc school authority t.o discipline st.udent.s. The nexus is 
about school surveillance. The task of this Article is not to address 
whether schools can discipline students for behavior like that in 
Ko·walski, should t.hey learn of it.s cxist.cnce.~•m The focus here is 
instead on limiting schools' authority to conduct comprehensive, 
indiscriminate surveillance of students' online and electronic activity 
anytime, anywhere. 
B. Hlh:if Not an Ownership Nc.cus or the First Arnendment 
Fm·cseeablc Disruption Standard 
One might. wonder vvhy ownership is not. a sufficient. nexus or the 
First Amendment foreseeable disruption standard is not offered as the 
standard for determining the bounds of school surveillance authority. 
After all, ownership of equipment. seems to come implicitly with the 
right of control. 1\loreover, the First Amendment foreseeable 
disruption standard has for decades provided a means for detennining 
when schools could, usually by way of student. discipline, regulate 
student speech.~"1 The primary reason is that neither offers a 
meaningful limit on school surveillance authority. 
Ownership is not a sufficient nexus because it still allows schools 
to monitor all students' online and electronic activity. \Vith such a 
nexus, if students usc schools' equipment., then t.hc schools could 
monitor all students' online and electronic activity whenever and 
wherever it occurs.262 In that case. the limit on school surveillance 
authority is not much of a restriction, especially for t.hc lower-income 
student.2r>:l Rejecting an ownership nexus does not mean that schools 
cannot control their device!'l given t.o student!'l. As noted above, they 
can and should be able to control their devices but do not need to 
259. Certainly, truly horrifying· behn.vior such as t-hreats to seriously harm 
st-udents 11nd videos of sexu11l nssaults may not be caught. by school 
~urveillanee. That does not mean ~uch activity cannot be di~eovered and 
addressed through other legal avenues, such as criminal search and 
prosecution. 
260. Kowalski, 602 F.3d at 067 (noting how a student "crcatredl and postfcdl 
to a !vlySpaee.corn webpage ... \vhich wa~ largely dedicated to 
ridiculing a fellow studenL"). 
261. Tinker v. De;; l'vloine;; Tndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 C.S. 0o:3 (1969). 
262. 81'-e 8'11pnL Part l.B.2. 
26:::1. Id. 
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comprehensively monitor students' online and electronic activity to do 
so. 
l.:' nder the foreseeable disruption doctrine, if the speech \vould 
"materially [disrupt] classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others," then it could be regulated by the 
school.264 This standard provides little guidance for \Vhen schools can 
monitor student online and electronic activity. Any speech might. 
materially disrupt the school no matter \vhen or where it occurs. So 
using this standard \vould f:ltill arguably a.llmv the schools to monitor 
students' online and electronic activity no matter when or where it 
occurs because it might materially disrupt the school. 
C. A Cau::;c uf Action 
Because no cybcrlmllying statute ha.<> a cause of action, students 
have no clear recourse if schools exceed their authority under the 
cyberbullying statutes or impose privacy hanns on them. 26''• This 
failnrc to provide students with a cause of action serves to further 
exacerbate the already-extant power imbalance imposed by the 
cyberbullying statutes.2M To better balance the pmver betv,reen 
student-citizens and the state in the form of schools, students need a 
cause of action so they can seek a remed:y when they suffer privacy 
harms or schools exceed the authority granted under the cyber-
bullying laws. Cyberbullying laws, therefore, need to be revised to 
include both the location nexus proposed here and a cause of action 
for students should schools exceed it. 
ln order to ensure that students really do have a remed:y under 
cyberbullying hnvs for excessive :mrveillance or privacy harms, t.he 
cause of action needs to more than simply exist in the statutes or 
apply to instances when the schools exceed the authority granted 
them in the statues. The provisions in the la>vs must also explicitly 
state that students can seck remedies for harms such as quelled 
speech, discrimination, blackmail, or other adverse effects they may 
have :mffered from broad, indiscriminate surveillance, or incorrect or 
incorrectly interpreted data.~;; ; How a student might sue for quelled 
speech likely seems less obvious than how one would sue for blackmail 
and discrimination as there are already ways to seek redress for 
blackmail and discrimination in other area.<> of law. One quelled speech 
claim a student could make. b:y way of example, is that the student's 
264. T-inker, :39:3 U.S. at ,"51:3. 
265. See supra Part III.B.:{. 
266. Sec 8upra Part TTT.n.t-2. 
267. To make the cause of aetion truly effective, of eourse, students 'vill also 
need lawyers. ¥.'hile only the wealt.hier students could afford a lawyer to 
file a lawsuit, the benefits of such hnvsuits ;vould surely inure to the 
low-income students. 
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speech has become so limited due to the comprehensive surveillance 
by the school that the student has no electronic or online forums in 
which she can safely, vvithout the \Vatching eyes of the schooL express 
her ideas. As a result, she can sue for both injunctive relief and 
damages for the loss of privacy and to ensure the school limits the 
surveillance so she does have electronic means of expressing herself 
without the school knowing about it. 
This proposal for a cause of action in cyberbullying statutes could 
be criticized on a couple of fronts. First, critics could argue that the 
Fonrth Amendment provides a remedy, obviating the need for an 
additional statutory cause of action. As explained in Part 11, students 
do have an argument that schools violate the Fourth Amendment 
when they conduct surveillance of their online and electronic activity. 
This potential constitutional claim, however, does not suffice as a 
vehicle for limiting schools' surveillance authority and student privacy 
harms for at least three reasons. First, since the conrts have nol. 
touched on whether this argument is valid, it is now just an 
a.rgmnent. Second, that argument is not foolproof. A court \vould 
likely apply Aclon as precedent for determining the reasonableness of 
broad school surveillance of student online and electronic activity 
instead of T.L. 0., smce school surveillance 1s more like the 
suspicionlcss drug testing in A cion than it is the suspicion-based 
search in T.L. 0. llmvever, under the Acton standard, the school 
would have a decent argument that the surveillance is reasonable. 
\Vhile not as limited a search as the drug testing in Acton, the 
argument exists that school surveillance does respond to a strong need 
for school intervention and discipline in order to combat 
cyberbullying, much like the searches in Acton. Finally, the Fourth 
Amendment protects against. intrusions when a legitimate expectation 
of privacy exists and has thus far tended to address injuries, like the 
use of unl<nvfully obtained evidence in prosecutions, or the denial of 
part.icipat.ion in a. school act.ivity. 268 It has not protected against "mere 
surveillance, "1 1;s• suggesting there may be no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in students' online posts270 
Sirnilarly, students also have lirnited recourse \Vhen making 
privacy claims in tort. School oiTicials have substantial immunity 
against privacy and other tort claims. 271 Therefore, for all these 
268. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 US :325, :341 (1985) (student subjected to delin-
quency proceedings aHer marij uana-clealing supplies found in her purse); 
Vernonin. Sch. Di;;t. 47J v. Acton, 010 U.S. 646 (1990) (discu;;;;ing how 
;;tudcnt wn;; ''denied pn.rticipation in his school's footbn.ll program when 
he ... refused to eon~ent to [drug] tPBt.ing"). 
269. Richards, supra note 19, at 19:::14; Clapper v. Amnesty Int.'l USA, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138 (2013). 
270. 81'.1'. 8U.Jrr·n Part ll.B.2. 
271. ·weber, supra not.e 244. 
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reasons, a cause of action under cybcrbnllying laws offers a clear way 
to provide students with needed means of recourse for overly broad 
surveillance and privacy harms. 
A second criticism of the call for a statutory or regulatory cause 
of action is that because the c,yberbullying laws will have to be 
amended to include these changes, the process will be slmv or may not 
happen at all. Amending statutes and regulations is no small maU.cr, 
politically or procedurall,y. However, the rapidity with which states 
have enacted these la\vs gives reason to think they could be amended 
just as quickly.m Admittedly, state legislators may be far less likely 
to rapidl.Y enact wa,ys to sue schools, but that does not make the 
solution in the form of the cause of action less necessary. \Vhen the 
stakes-students' privacy rights-arc so high, the solutions thai. 
would offer real protection should be crafted regardless of the 
procedural difficulties. 
It is vvorth stating here too that in addition to not providing any 
mechanism for redress for students, the c:yberbull:ying statutes do 
little, or nothing in most cases, to address the root causes of 
cybcrbullying: bullying more generally or its effects on victims. They 
are simply disciplinary statutes,27:1 and most t,ypically that discipline 
comes in the blunt forms of either suspension or expulsion.274 
Although this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, these failures 
in the c,yberbullying laws are worth at least identif:y·ing alongside their 
other failures. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Students need protection from c:yberbull:ying, a.nd schools are an 
obvious place to turn for providing at least some of that protection. 
Schools have students in their custody for six or more hours a day for 
the majority of the year, and c:yberbullying often occurs among 
272. )/lost cyberbullying statutes and regulations ha.ve been enacted since 
2008. See Thomas & l'vlurphy, supra note 2. Admittedly, states may not 
ViTork as quickly to enact laws giving· students a Viray to sue schools . 
HO\vever, the ability to quickly enact la\vs to protect students, >vhich is 
Virhat the quickly enacted cyberbullying laws represent, exists. Thus, the 
capacity exists to quickly amend those laws to include causes of action 
that would serve t.o better protect student.s. 
273. For example, Indiana's bullying statute is part of its school disciplinary 
code. bm. Com:: § 20-:33-8-0.2 (2007). Utah's bullying statute calls for 
the suspension or expulsion of students for ''behavior or threatened 
behavior which po~es u.n immediate and significant t-hreat to the wclfn.rc, 
~afety, or moral;; of other students or school personnel or to the 
operation of the school." UTAll CoDE Al\'N. § ;);)A-ll-904(1)(c) 
(LexisNexis 20U). 
274. ll\D. ConE§ 20-33-8-0.2 (2007): 'l~TAH Com; A:'fl\·. § ii3A-11-904(1)(c) 
(LcxisNcxis 2013). 
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students.~'" In examining the cyberbullying laws across the states, this 
Article has identified the problematic ways these statutes have sought 
to provide that protection by calling attention to the unprecedented 
expansion of school authority embodied in those laws. The laws 
expand school authorit:y iu a majority of states so far beyond the 
traditional schoolhouse gates that anywhere and everyvvhere is 
arguably "in school.'' As well intentioned as the laws may be and as 
uecessar,y as a response to cyberbull,ying is, the laws also implicate 
privacy banns for student that are 1nade more acute because of 
schools' authority over students. The laws, therefore, need to be 
reworked. A nexus framework that is subject to Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness requirements linking school surveillance authority to 
when students arc at school or school-related activities-needs to be 
imposed ou the laws. Also, the laws need to provide students more 
agency in the form of a cause of action so they can seek redress vvhen 
schools exceed their authority and impose privacy harms. Then the 
laws 1vill better work to protect students, place meaningful limits ou 
school authority, and prevent privacy harms on students. 
27G. Sec supra notes 6, 211, a.nd a.ccompa.nying text. 
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